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CANDIDATE PRIVACY
Rebecca Green*
Abstract: In the United States, we have long accepted that candidates for public office who
have voluntarily stepped into the public eye sacrifice claims to privacy. This refrain is rooted
deep within the American enterprise, emanating from the Framers’ concept of the informed
citizen as a bedrock of democracy. Voters must have full information about candidates to make
their choices at the ballot box. Even as privacy rights for ordinary citizens have expanded,
privacy theorists and courts continue to exempt candidates from privacy protections. This
Article suggests that two disruptions warrant revisiting the privacy interests of candidates. The
first is a changing information architecture brought on by the rise of the internet and digital
media that drastically alters how information about candidates is collected and circulated. The
second is a shift in who runs for office. As women and minorities—targets of the worst forms
of harassment—increasingly throw their hats in the ring, this Article argues that competing
democratic values should challenge previous assumptions about candidate privacy. Far from
suggesting easy answers, this Article offers a framework for courts to weigh candidate privacy
interests in a more nuanced way, drawing on vetting principles for aspirants to other positions
of public trust. While there are good reasons candidates should have far less privacy than
ordinary citizens, the reflexive denial of candidate privacy must have its limits if we care about
nourishing our evolving democracy.
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INTRODUCTION
After Gary Hart told a Miami Herald reporter during the 1988
presidential campaign season that he’d done nothing “immoral,”1 and that
he held himself “to a high standard of public and private conduct,”2 the
decades-old gentleman’s agreement that the press would not report on the
extramarital detours of candidates for president fell by the wayside.3 The
reporter who asked Hart about his affair explained that he did not intend
to delve into the question for salacious reasons but did so only upon Hart’s
affirmative denial.4 This reporter believed Hart had lied.5 And, he decided,
that a candidate’s lie is information voters should know.6
This event unleashed a flurry of scholarship about the ethics of
reporting on the personal lives of candidates for office.7 Commentators
1. Paul Taylor, Letter to the Editor, Asking Gary Hart the Question He Asked For, N.Y. TIMES
(May 22, 1987), https://www.nytimes.com/1987/05/22/opinion/l-asking-gary-hart-the-question-heasked-for-126787.html [https://perma.cc/YXK4-KW6L].
2. Id.
3. Throughout this country’s history, the press was full of real and made-up stories of politicians’
peccadillos. For a colorful description of one example, see VIRGINIUS DABNEY, THE JEFFERSON
SCANDALS: A REBUTTAL 8–10 (1981) (describing a reporter at the Richmond Recorder’s efforts in
1802 to expose Thomas Jefferson’s alleged affair with Betsey Walker). See generally Charles S.
Clark, Politicians and Privacy, 2 CQ RESEARCHER 37 (1992). President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s term
in office is widely credited as having rewritten “the rules of engagement for the relationship between
the press and the politicians they covered.” LARRY J. SABATO, FEEDING FRENZY 29 (1991). As Sabato
describes, “[t]he Rooseveltian rule of thumb for press coverage of politicians was simple, and it
endured for forty years . . . : The private life of a public figure should stay private and undisclosed
unless it seriously impinged on his or her public performance.” Id. at 30. And even then, Sabato notes,
reporters often still declined to report. Id.; see also Clark, supra, at 4 (describing the sea of change
the Hart incident brought about: “[m]ainstream journalism reached the pinnacle of its pursuit of the
adultery issue when it dug into the private life of Democratic presidential hopeful Gary Hart in May
1987. The coverage of Hart broke new ground . . . .”).
4. See Taylor, supra note 1.
5. See id. Subsequent reporting suggests the truth may have been more complicated. See James
Fallows, Was Gary Hart Set Up?, THE ATLANTIC (Nov. 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/
magazine/archive/2018/11/was-gary-hart-set-up/570802/
[https://perma.cc/E5UW-K63X]
(describing how Lee Atwater may have set Gary Hart up for the fall).
6. See Taylor, supra note 1.
7. See, e.g., Sanford Levinson, Public Lives and the Limits of Privacy, 21 POL. SCI. & POL. 263
(1988) (“The very fact that public figures are by definition ‘newsworthy’ means that in fact they
forego any legal protection against the publication of true facts about them, however embarrassing or
offensive such publication might be.”); see also Ralph G. Elliot, The Private Lives of Public Servants:
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largely came to a consensus: candidates are fair game.8 Today, the
personal lives, medical histories, criminal records, financial dealings, and
mountains of other personal information about candidates are regularly
circulated during campaigns.9 And that is as it should be if you believe
that voters have the right to decide what information is relevant to their
choices at the ballot box.
But the modern campaign environment suggests some reasons for
pause. First, the gatekeeper role the press traditionally played in vetting
candidates is gone.10 In today’s campaigns, any person (and even nonhumans)11 can access and share material about candidates, reaching
millions of eyeballs. Second, even as the drive for more diverse
representation expands,12 disproportionate online and offline harassment
of women and minority13 candidates impacts whether such individuals
seek office.14
What Is the Public Entitled to Know?, 27 CONN. L. REV. 821, 826–27 (1995); Anita L. Allen, Privacy
and the Public Official: Talking About Sex as a Dilemma for Democracy, 67 GEO. WASH. L REV.
1165, 1170 (1999) (but noting that “the notion that public officials should be denied privacy does not
follow from the premise that the public should trust and expect accountability of public officials.”).
Bill Clinton’s scandals did their part to fan the scholarship flame soon after. See, e.g., JEFFREY ROSEN,
THE UNWANTED GAZE: THE DESTRUCTION OF PRIVACY IN AMERICA (2000), the first lines of which
read, “[t]his book began as an effort to understand the constitutional, legal, and political drama that
culminated in the impeachment and acquittal of President Bill Clinton.” Id. at 3.
8. Id.
9. Some information emanates from required disclosures at the state and federal level; other
information comes via reporters and others. In many cases, candidates voluntarily disclose personal
information to beat the press to it. In the 2020 Democratic primary, many candidates voluntarily
disclosed their tax returns. Reid J. Epstein & Richard Rubin, Democratic Presidential Candidates
Release Tax Returns, Urge Others to Follow Suit, WALL STREET J. (Mar. 29, 2019),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/democratic-presidential-candidates-release-tax-returns-urge-others-tofollow-suit-11553893002 (last visited Dec. 19, 2019).
10. See infra section II.A.
11. See Jonah E. Bromwich, Bots of the Internet, Reveal Yourselves!, N.Y. TIMES (July 16, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/16/style/how-to-regulate-bots.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2020)
(discussing California legislation aimed at curbing distortions in political discourse caused by bots).
12. Multiple national and state-level groups are dedicated to increasing the number of and
supporting minority and women candidates. See, e.g., EMILY’S LIST, https://www.emilyslist.org
[https://perma.cc/6XMF-ZTRJ] (pro-choice Democratic women); GET HER ELECTED,
https://www.getherelected.com [https://perma.cc/6EV3-ZEBQ] (progressive women); VICTORY
INSTITUTE, https://victoryinstitute.org [https://perma.cc/HGY4-3UD6] (LGBTQ candidates);
HIGHER HEIGHTS FOR AMERICA, https://www.higherheightsforamerica.org [https://perma.cc/E967R22Z] (Black women); IGNITE, http://ignite.org [https://perma.cc/H3U8-SHA9] (young people); SHE
SHOULD RUN, https://www.sheshouldrun.org [https://perma.cc/FCH4-XUNH] (women); MAGGIE’S
LIST, http://maggieslist.org (last visited Feb. 15, 2020) (Conservative women).
13. The word “minority” as used here is intended to reference racial and sexual minorities as well
as individuals belonging to other marginalized groups.
14. Jennifer Lawless & Richard Fox, Men Rule: The Continued Under-Representation of Women
in U.S. Politics, AM. U. WOMEN & POL. INST. 11 (2012), https://www.american.edu/spa/wpi/upload/
2012-Men-Rule-Report-final-web.pdf [https://perma.cc/6V7B-PBGT] (“[W]omen are significantly
more likely than men to be deterred from running for office because of the potential loss of
privacy . . . .”); see also infra section II.B.
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Numerous women and minority candidates’ experiences bear this out
in the United States and around the world.15 Take for example Kiah
Morris, Vermont’s only female African American member of the state
legislature—until she resigned from office and dropped out of her
reelection campaign in 2018. Morris experienced significant and severe
harassment at her home and online: a home invasion, threatening and
racist graffiti, and death threats.16 Upon her resignation, Morris’s
bitterness was evident:
[T]o know that as an elected official and as a person of
prominence that I couldn’t even find the protection and the justice
that my family deserves so that we can have a sense of peace—
that we weren’t able to access that, that the system was not there
in the ways that we needed—that is stunning.17
Across the pond, instances of horrific online abuse targeted at female
politicians in the UK Parliament have prompted many women to bow out
of politics altogether.18 On November 1, 2019, eighteen female members
of Parliament announced they would not seek reelection. As one female
lawmaker lamented upon sharing her decision, “I am exhausted by the
invasion into my privacy and the nastiness and intimidation that has
become commonplace.”19 A study of abusive tweets in Britain’s 2017
general election revealed that Dianne Abbott, Parliament’s first black
female lawmaker, bore the brunt of nearly half of the abusive tweets
15. The United States is currently experiencing a political environment in which overt misogyny
and racism from the highest levels of our government toward sitting officials and candidates for office
is common. See infra note 16.
16. Jess Aloe, Attorney General: No Charges in Racial Harassment of Former Rep. Kiah Morris,
BURLINGTON FREE PRESS, (Jan. 15, 2019, 10:48 AM), https://www.burlingtonfreepress.com/story/
news/2019/01/14/racial-harassment-led-kiah-morris-resign-crime-bennington-tj-donovan-attorneygeneral-vermont/2547664002/ [perma.cc/FAW9-YCUE]; Meagan Flynn, A White Nationalist’s
Harassment Helped Force a Black Female Lawmaker to Resign. He Won’t Face Charges, WASH.
POST (Jan. 15, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2019/01/15/white-nationalistsharassment-helped-force-black-female-lawmaker-resign-he-wont-facecharges/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.979eae09d6a6 [https://perma.cc/7LUM-E4LX]. A full report on
extent of harassment is compiled on the state’s website. See OFFICE OF THE VT. ATT’Y
GEN.,VERMONT ATTORNEY GENERAL’S OFFICE’S FINDINGS REGARDING THE INVESTIGATION OF
REPORTED CRIMES AGAINST FORMER VERMONT STATE REPRESENTATIVE, KIAH MORRIS AND HER
FAMILY,
https://ago.vermont.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/Morris-Investigation-and-LegalFindings.pdf [https://perma.cc/37LF-Q26G].
17. Liam Stack, Black Female Lawmaker in Vermont Resigns After Racial Harassment, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 26, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/26/us/politics/kiah-morris-vermont.html
[https://perma.cc/E443-ZU9K].
18. Megan Specia, Threats and Abuse Prompt Female Lawmakers to Leave U.K. Parliament, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 1, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/01/world/europe/women-parliamentabuse.html [https://perma.cc/ZC4F-YNKC] (“Sexually charged rhetoric has been prevalent in the
online abuse of female [Members of Parliament] with threats to rape us and referring to us by our
genitalia.”).
19. Id.
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leveled against all lawmakers.20 Explicitly citing the abuse she received,
Abbott decided against seeking reelection.21
While the bright glare of running for office shines on every candidate,22
are certain kinds of candidates facing more and harsher privacy incursions
than others? Will this result in a weakened, less diverse field?23 What do
we lose when strong candidates decide to not run because of cybermobs
and targeted attacks?24 Candidates have long faced intense scrutiny, but

20. See Black and Asian Women MPs Abused More Online, AMNESTY INT’L U.K.,
https://www.amnesty.org.uk/online-violence-women-mps [perma.cc/6XTY-MC5U].
21. Simon Murphy, Diane Abbott Speaks Out on Online Abuse as Female MPs Step Down,
GUARDIAN (Oct. 31, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/oct/31/diane-abbott-speaksout-on-online-abuse-as-female-mps-step-down [https://perma.cc/YMZ9-SBYU].
22. There are countless examples of grievous privacy invasions of non-minority candidates today
and reaching back across the decades. See Sabato, supra note 3, at 25–52 (chronicling the privacyinvasive nature of the press in reporting on candidates and politicians). Leadership figures in the
private sector have commonly faced similar privacy incursions as a consequence of high-profile roles.
See Victoria Schwartz, Disclosing Corporate Disclosure Policies, 40 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 487, 505,
533 (2013) (examining privacy interests of corporate chief executive officer candidates during the
vetting process).
23. Many groups advocating for increased minority and women’s representation at all political
levels believe that democracy is enhanced when traditional barriers to minority and women candidates
are challenged. See supra note 12. In the case of women, studies bear this out. See, e.g., Lonna R.
Atkenson & Nancy Carillo, More is Better: The Influence of Collective Female Descriptive
Representation on External Efficacy, POL. & GENDER 3, 79 (2007) (noting that an increase in female
representatives increases female citizens’ belief that government is responsive); Susan B. Hansen,
Talking About Politics: Gender and Contextual Effects on Political Proselytizing, 59 J. POL. 73 (1997)
(women in congressional districts with female representation more willing to discuss politics);
Caroline Hubbard, Violence Against Women: A Threat to Participatory Democracy, NAT’L
DEMOCRATIC INST.: DEMOCRACY WORKS (June 27, 2016), https://www.demworks.org/violenceagainst-women-threat-participatory-democracy [perma.cc/3XRJ-H836] (“As half the world’s
population, women are a key part of any democracy and their full and equal participation is a human
right, and a measure of democratic integrity.”).
24. What is a “good candidate”? The answer will vary with each voter. For present purposes, a
good candidate is understood as an individual dedicated to serving the public interest over their own
whose intellect, empathy, life experiences, and skills make them a capable and responsible
representative of constituent needs and interests. Some organizations have posted guides to help
voters determine what to look for. See, e.g., League of Women Voters Educ. Fund, How to Judge a
Candidate, SMARTVOTER, http://www.smartvoter.org/voter/judgecan.html [https://perma.cc/553Q9S33]. Scholars have long studied and documented the inverse relationship between media scrutiny
and the quality of public officials. Larry Sabato, for example, writing in 1993, observed that
“American society today is losing the services of many exceptionally talented individuals who would
make outstanding contributions to the commonweal, but who understandably will not subject
themselves and their loved ones to abusive, intrusive press coverage.” Sabato, supra note 3, at 211.
In 2006, political scientist Daniel Sutter set out to test whether privacy costs lowered the quality of
candidates who run for office. Daniel Sutter, Media Scrutiny and the Quality of Public Officials, 129
PUB. CHOICE 25 (2006). He found in part, “[g]ood [candidates] may experience more disutility from
the distress of family and friends when private matters are exposed to public scrutiny. Concern for
others may be a defining element of character. Zealots and megalomaniacs will bear any burden to
secure office, including costs imposed on family members. If these indeed are negative character
traits, [lower quality candidates] may well have lower privacy costs.” Id. at 35; see also TYLER
COWEN, WHAT PRICE FAME? 130–61 (2000) (discussing how privacy invasion affects public figures).
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the current information environment is unlike any in U.S. history.25 Is it
possible to enter a race for public office today without losing dignity? This
Article explores privacy incursions candidates currently face and suggests
that traditional refusals to protect candidate privacy be revisited.26
An important threshold question is whether “privacy” is the right label
to affix to the challenges described.27 Paradigmatic examples of invasions
of candidate privacy are disclosures about their sex lives or medical
ailments. Is the harassment Kiah Morris experienced a privacy invasion?
Are barrages of anonymous online death and rape threats privacy harms?
State and federal cyberstalking and harassment laws could address these
problems, though they commonly fail to provide adequate protections—
as evidenced by the experience of Kiah Morris.28 Recent work on sexual
25. The widespread practice of candidate “tracking” (for instance, hiring people to follow
candidates and record them) as part of opposition research is now standard. See Peter Callaghan, How
the ‘tracker’ became strangest, most important job in campaign politics, MINNPOST (Sept. 17, 2018),
https://www.minnpost.com/state-government/2018/09/how-the-tracker-became-strangest-mostimportant-job-in-campaign-politics/ [https://perma.cc/FHM2-UFA3]; Tim Reid, Special Report: The
Golden Age of Opposition Research, REUTERS (Nov. 14, 2011), https://www.reuters.com/article/uscampaign-opporesearch/special-report-the-golden-age-of-opposition-researchidUSTRE7AD0M920111114 [https://perma.cc/PE48-VBFZ].
26. Why only candidates? Why not discuss the privacy interests of sitting public officials as well?
Why not also weigh the privacy interests of all public servants, whether elected or appointed? The
present effort leaves the interests of sitting officials for another day (unless, of course, the sitting
official is running for reelection). As Victoria Schwartz suggests, privacy interests of candidates for
office are in some ways more pressing than those of sitting officials. Schwartz, supra note 22, at 47
(“[T]he disclosure of personal information that could impact the performance of an elected official is
more important during the campaign, when voters need to make an informed decision . . . .”). For
analytic clarity and because this Article’s focus is on democratic values underpinning U.S. elections,
this effort addresses only the privacy interests of those running for office. Quite a lot has been written
about government transparency and oversight and the need to access information about sitting
officeholders and their decisions as a matter of government accountability. See, e.g., AKHLAQUE
HAQUE, SURVEILLANCE, TRANSPARENCY AND DEMOCRACY: PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN THE
INFORMATION AGE (2015); TROUBLING TRANSPARENCY: THE HISTORY AND FUTURE OF FREEDOM
OF INFORMATION (David E. Pozen & Michael Schudson eds., 2018); MICHAEL SCHUDSON, THE RISE
OF THE RIGHT TO KNOW: POLITICS AND THE CULTURE OF TRANSPARENCY, 1945–1975, at 16 (2015)
(describing the “transparency imperative and a new embrace of the right to know”).
27. Privacy as a concept is notoriously vague. Daniel Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA.
L. REV. 477, 553 (2006) (discussing how elusive the concept has proved and providing a taxonomy
for understanding the term). In the case of candidate privacy, the question of what is private can elicit
a circular response: if disclosures about candidates traverse some cultural boundary, a violation occurs
only once that boundary (however defined) is crossed. This circularity is a perennial problem in
privacy law, particularly in the Fourth Amendment search and seizure realm which in part relies on
subjective expectations of privacy determine whether privacy will be protected. But see Matthew B.
Kugler & Lior J. Strahilevitz, The Myth of Fourth Amendment Circularity, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 1747,
1747 (2017) (arguing that “popular privacy expectations are far more stable than most judges and
commentators have been assuming”).
28. See e.g., DANIELLE K. CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE 123–27 (2014) (describing the
failure of traditional criminal law to address cyberharassment). A parallel instance of the law rising
to address new forms of harm is the development of criminal revenge porn prohibitions—a new form
of legal protection for victims of nonconsensual pornography. Cyberstalking and harassment laws fell
short of fully protecting the interests of victims in those cases. Recognizing changed circumstances
and new forms of harm, forty-six states now have revenge porn statutes on the books. See Forty-Six
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privacy and cyber harassment demonstrates that the failure of the law to
address these harms silences its victims and chills speech.29 When victims
are candidates for office, the injury broadens from an individual harm to
one that threatens the democratic process. This Article suggests that
protecting candidate privacy is about more than shrouding true, private
facts about them. It takes an intersectional,30 broad view of candidate
privacy that includes non-libelous attacks on the dignity interests of
candidates.31 Protection of those dignity interests could come from many
sources. Thus far, the law has weighed heavily against candidates looking
to privacy law for redress for dignity-based harms.32 But should it?
Traditional candidate privacy debates have focused on the disclosure
question: whether the media should report on the private lives of
candidates.33 Legal scholars have written about candidate privacy using
this frame.34 But much of this commentary predates the rise of the internet
States and D.C and One Territory Now Have Revenge Porn Laws, CYBER C.R.
INITIATIVE, https://www.cybercivilrights.org/revenge-porn-laws/ [perma.cc/WZ7K-NWJD];
Danielle K. Citron & Mary A. Franks, Criminalizing Revenge Porn, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 345
(2014); infra section III.B.
29. Danielle K. Citron, Sexual Privacy, 128 YALE L.J. 1870, 1915–16 (2019) (describing, inter alia,
how sexual privacy invasions can operate to silence victims); Danielle K. Citron & Jonathon W.
Penney, When Law Frees Us to Speak, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 2317, 2319 (2019) (“Online abuse has
a ‘totalizing and devastating impact’ upon victims . . . . Because online abuse disproportionately
impacts women and marginalized communities, so does the silencing that it produces.” (quoting
CITRON, supra note 28, at 29)).
30. See Kimberlé Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and
Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1243 (1991) (describing violence against
women as often the product of intersecting patterns of racism and sexism).
31. Defamation law provides an avenue for candidates to remedy a certain class of dignity harms—
when lies about them are told. See infra section I.C (distinguishing defamation and privacy claims).
Politicians routinely call for changes to defamation law to make it easier for them to go after
defendants. Adam Liptak, Justice Clarence Thomas Calls for Reconsideration of Landmark Libel
Ruling, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 19, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/19/us/politics/clarencethomas-first-amendment-libel.html (last visited Jan. 17, 2020) (quoting President Trump as saying,
“I am going to open up libel laws so when they write purposefully negative and horrible and false
articles, we can sue them and win lots of money”). Acknowledging that a higher standard of proof is
appropriate for defamatory speech about candidates and officials, the present effort explores how best
to calibrate privacy protections when information is true.
32. See infra Part I.
33. See, e.g., Dorota Mokrosinska, How Much Privacy for Public Officials?, in SOCIAL
DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY: INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES 181, 181 (Beate Roessler & Dorota
Mokrosinska eds., 2015); Clark, supra note 3, at 3 (noting that journalists are “still struggling to write
their ethical rulebook”); Louis W. Hodges, The Journalist and Privacy, 12 SOC. RESP.: JOURNALISM
L. MED. 5 (1983); Stanley A. Renshon, Some Observations on Character and Privacy Issues in
Presidential Campaigns, 13 POL. PSYCHOL. 565, 583 (1992).
34. Those weighing in generally conclude that the law does not protect candidate privacy. See, e.g.,
Allen, supra note 7, at 1170; Teneille R. Brown, Double Helix, Double Standards: Private Matters
and Public People, 11 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 295 (2008) (providing a comprehensive
discussion of legal rules governing disclosure of presidential candidates’ health information);
Levinson, supra note 7, at 263; Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961
SUP. CT. REV. 245, 259 (1961) (If a “verbal attack is made in order to show the unfitness of a candidate
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and the current degradation of public discourse it has engendered.35 This
Article contributes to legal scholarship on candidate privacy by taking the
present context into account. Part I chronicles the democratic mainstay of
the “informed citizen” as the basis for the right of access to information
about candidates for office. It discusses the durability of this principle
among early privacy theorists and by courts routinely protecting the
public’s right to know. Part II lays out a set of changed circumstances,
namely a radically transformed information environment and a changing
makeup of who runs for political office in the United States. It argues that
these fundamental shifts warrant rethinking the reflexive denial of
candidate privacy interests. Part III starts with a comparative analysis of
lawyer vetting, suggesting a set of core principles that support a more
nuanced approach to protecting the privacy interests of candidates. It next
applies a framework drawn from this comparison, showing examples of
how candidate privacy might be revisited. Finally, it demonstrates how
weighing candidate privacy in a more nuanced way does not inevitably
inhibit voters’ informed choices at the ballot box. Acknowledging that the
public right to know is rightly the default, it examines whether privacy
law might assist candidates in defending their dignity while still ensuring
that information about them circulates to voters.
I.

DEMOCRATIC TRADITION AND CANDIDATE (NON)
PRIVACY

A.

The Informed Citizen

That privacy enhances democracy is a well-settled principle. As Justice
Brennan famously framed, without privacy “the hazard that as a people
we may become hagridden and furtive is not fantasy.”36 Yet when it comes
for governmental office, the act is properly regarded as a citizen’s participation in government. It is,
therefore, protected by the First Amendment”).
35. See generally Richard L. Hasen, Deep Fakes, Bots, and Siloed Justices: American Election Law
in
a
Post-Truth
World,
S T.
LOUIS
L.
REV.
7
(forthcoming
2020),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3430588&download=yes (last visited Jan. 17,
2020) (describing the “post-truth era” in politics).
36. Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 470 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also P. ALLAN
DIONISOPOULOS & CRAIG R. DUCAT, THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY: ESSAYS AND CASES 2 (1976) (“[I]n a
free and democratic society, public affairs are usually marked by openness and private affairs are
normally shielded from view, while, in totalitarian states, the reverse is generally true.”); THOMAS I.
EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 546 (1970) (“[A] system of privacy is vital to
the working of the democratic process.”); Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human
Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 1003 (1964) (“The man who is
compelled to live every minute of his life among others and whose every need, thought, desire, fancy
or gratification is subject to public scrutiny, has been deprived of his individuality and human
dignity.”); Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 483 (1968) (noting that “privacy has
a . . . defensive role in protecting our liberty”); Hodges, supra note 33, at 10 (“Indeed [privacy] lies
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to candidates for public office, it is an equally settled democratic value
that citizens must be adequately informed about candidates.37 Early
democratic theorists reasoned that the ability to adequately vet candidates
is the cornerstone of democracy.38 John Locke suggested two core pillars
in a democracy: first, that government cannot exist without the consent of
the governed, and second, that adults must be free to exercise informed
consent.39 The Framers tied the legitimacy of government to an informed
citizenry: the people must have in some meaningful sense chosen the
government and its policies. James Madison wrote that the right to elect
members of government “depends on the knowledge of the comparative
merits and demerits of the candidates for public trust; and on the equal
freedom, consequently, of examining and discussing these merits and
demerits of the candidates respectively.”40 John Adams took this right to
the heavenly realm, writing that the people had a divine right to know the
“characters and conduct” of their rulers.41
The concept of an informed citizenry drove post-revolutionary leaders
to establish institutions that would ensure that citizens could actively
participate in democracy, including the free press, schools, colleges,
libraries, and learned societies.42 Over time, especially as voting rights
expanded, the importance of an informed citizenry became even more
firmly rooted, establishing to not just the right to make informed decisions
at the ballot box, but also to information about the machinations of
government and officials managing it.43
As the next section describes, when legal theorists first began to frame
the “right of privacy,” the concept of an informed citizenry proved durable
in exempting candidates from the privacy protections sought.

at the very heart of the most cherished values of western civilization: freedom, the dignity of
humankind, and individual autonomy.”).
37. The concept of an informed citizenry has its roots in British political thought as a bulwark
against tyranny. See generally RICHARD D. BROWN, THE STRENGTH OF A PEOPLE: THE IDEA OF AN
INFORMED CITIZENRY IN AMERICA 1650–1870 (1996).
38. Id. at xiii (“For at least two centuries, Americans have believed in the idea that citizens should
be informed in order to be able to exercise their civic responsibilities wisely.”).
39. See generally GILLIAN BROWN, THE CONSENT OF THE GOVERNED: THE LOCKEAN LEGACY IN
EARLY AMERICAN CULTURE 20–21 (2001) (citing John Locke, The Second Treatise, in TWO
TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 34, 84–85 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988)).
40. JAMES MADISON, THE VIRGINIA REPORT OF 1799–1800, TOUCHING THE ALIEN AND SEDITION
LAWS; TOGETHER WITH THE VIRGINIA RESOLUTIONS 227 (J.W. Randolph ed., 1850).
41. John Adams, A Dissertation of the Canon and Feudal Law, No. 3, in PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS
118, 120–21 (Robert J. Taylor et al. eds., Harvard Univ. Press 1977) (Boston Gazette 1765).
42. BROWN, supra note 37, at 67–84.
43. Id. at 205–07. Historically, the concept of the informed citizen as a precondition of democracy
excluded huge swaths of the population due to the widespread exclusion of women and African
Americans from both voting and educational opportunity. Id. at 157–95.
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Privacy Theory Foundations and the Explicit Exclusion of
Candidates from Privacy Protections

In 1891, in their famed article The Right to Privacy, Samuel Warren
and Lewis Brandeis situated the recognition of personal privacy in a
natural progression of the civilizing effect of law.44 Charting the urgency
of protecting personal dignity in the face of an increasingly intrusive
media and advancing technology (in their case the rise of instantaneous
photography), Warren and Brandeis set the stage for courts to recognize
the “right to be let alone.”45 The pair are widely credited for advancing an
actionable right to privacy in U.S. law.46 As strident as they were in
advocating for the right of privacy, Warren and Brandeis explicitly
excluded candidates for public office from the privacy protections
they championed:
Peculiarities of manner and person, which in the ordinary
individual should be free from comment, may acquire a public
importance, if found in a candidate for public office. . . . To
publish of a modest and retiring individual that he suffers from an
impediment in his speech or that he cannot spell correctly, is an
unwarranted, if not an unexampled, infringement of his rights,
while to state and comment on the same characteristics found in
a would-be congressman could not be regarded as beyond the pale
of propriety.47
Warren and Brandeis have been criticized for their elitist approach to
privacy protection:48 i.e., that elites (like them) should be protected from
the idle and prying eyes of the “indolent masses.”49 Even still, they
44. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 193
(1890–1891) (“Political, social and economic changes entail the recognition of new rights, and the
common law, in its eternal youth, grows to meet the demands of society.”).
45. Id. at 195. Warren and Brandeis understood privacy as very much a dignity-based right. They
describe the tension protecting privacy entails as a line between “dignity and convenience of the
individual” versus the “demands of the public welfare or of private justice.” Id. at 214.
46. Dorothy J. Glancy, The Invention of the Right to Privacy, 21 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 1 (1979) (“[The
right to privacy] dates back to a law review article published in December of 1890 by two young
Boston lawyers, Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis. Roscoe Pound described this article as having
done ‘nothing less than add a chapter to our law.’” (quoting Letter from Roscoe Pound to William
Chilton (1916))); see also Irwin R. Kramer, The Birth of Privacy Law: A Century Since Warren and
Brandeis, 39 CATH. U. L. REV. 703, 703 (1990).
47. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 44, at 215.
48. ROBERT E. SMITH, BEN FRANKLIN’S WEB SITE: PRIVACY AND CURIOSITY FROM PLYMOUTH
ROCK TO THE INTERNET 125, 135-36 (2000).
49. Id. at 196 (“To occupy the indolent, column upon column is filled with idle gossip. . . . [M]an,
under the refining influence of culture, has become more sensitive to publicity.”); see also NEIL
RICHARDS, INTELLECTUAL PRIVACY: RETHINKING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE DIGITAL AGE 19 (2015)
(“Warren and Brandeis clearly wanted to protect the refined sensibilities of elites from the unwanted
gaze of their social inferiors . . . .”).
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exempted one particular sort of elite from the privacy protections they
sought: candidates.
Later privacy theorists echoed Warren and Brandeis’s exemption. In
his influential 1960 law review article Privacy, William Prosser
categorized intervening judicial recognition of privacy rights since
Warren and Brandeis’s article into four distinct privacy torts.50 In this
categorization, Prosser mentioned candidates for office only once, in a
section discussing the First Amendment limits of tort privacy.51 As an
example of an individual whose privacy torts should not protect, Prosser
noted that “there is very little in the way of information about the President
of the United States, or any candidate for that high office, that is not a
matter of legitimate public concern.”52
In his subsequent writing, Prosser underscored a common law privilege
against recovery in tort for commentary on public figures, including,
prototypically, candidates.53 Still, Prosser did acknowledge that
candidates may retain privacy interest despite their public status.
Describing how courts generally approached the question of the personal
lives of candidates, Prosser wrote:
One question upon which there has as yet been little discussion is
the common law limitation that ‘fair comment’ extends only to
matter bearing upon the . . . fitness of the . . . candidate, and not
to his purely private life or character as an individual. It is
obvious, of course, that in many instances the latter will have an
obvious bearing upon the former; but where it did not, it was held
that the privilege did not extend to it.54

50. William Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960). Prosser served as chief reporter
and codified his four privacy torts in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B-E (2019); see
also Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Prosser’s Privacy Law: A Mixed Legacy, 98 CALIF. L.
REV. 1887, 1888 (2010) (Prosser’s four privacy torts are: Intrusion Upon Seclusion, § 652B;
Appropriation of Name or Likeness, § 652C; Disclosure/Publicity Given to Private Life, § 652D; and
False Light, § 652E). Richards and Solove describe criticism of Prosser’s fossilized four-part
characterization of tort privacy, noting Edward Bloustein’s 1964 critique. Id. at 1914 (“Bloustein
suggested that privacy invasions were not four distinct interests with little in common, for they all
shared a similar trait: they were ‘demeaning to individuality’ and ‘an affront to personal dignity.’”
(citing Bloustein, supra note 36, at 973)).
51. Prosser, supra note 50, at 417–18 (The full sentence reads, “[p]erhaps there is very little in the
way of information about the President of the United States, or any candidate for that high office, that
is not a matter of legitimate public concern; but when a mere member of the armed forces is in
question, the line is drawn at his military service, and those things that more or less directly bear
upon it.”).
52. Id. at 417. Prosser also cites disclosures of Grover Cleveland’s alleged illegitimate child in 1884,
presumably as an example of a private matter legitimately in the public interest. Id. at 417 n.282.
53. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 822 (4th ed. 1971).
54. Id. (emphasis added).
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Prosser then signaled, however, that such recognition might be curbed
under the First Amendment.55
Alan Westin, another “founding father” in the field of privacy law and
author of the seminal 1967 book Privacy and Freedom, argued powerfully
that privacy constituted a core pillar in democratic society in contrast with
totalitarian states in which citizens have none.56 Yet Westin too made
exceptions for candidates for public office (and government transparency
generally). He warned that “[p]ersons who venture into . . . civic life
sometimes claim an unjustified right to privacy from fair reply or fair
criticism.”57 Westin acknowledged that there must be “enough privacy to
nourish individual creativity and group expression; [but] enough publicity
of government affairs to let the public know the facts necessary to form
judgments in political matters.”58
Foundational privacy theorists, conscious of the democratic tradition
of an informed citizenry and the voluntary nature of running for office,
consistently carved candidates out of the privacy protections they
promoted. As the next section demonstrates, courts faced with candidate
assertions of privacy have done so as well.
C.

Courts and Candidate Privacy

Candidates have sought legal protection from violations of their
privacy in numerous contexts, using numerous legal levers—from tort to

55. Id. (“The rule appears to be an obviously reasonable one, and it may no doubt be expected to
be taken over under the Constitution.”).
56. ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 24–25 (1967).
57. Id. at 25. Voluntariness, or as Westin describes, “venturing into public debates or civic life,” is
an animating feature of privacy theorists’ dismissal of candidate privacy. Id. It is a choice. Similarly,
such agency has long been cited to brush away sexual privacy incursions. Citron, Sexual Privacy,
supra note 29, at 1876 (“[S]aying that victims ‘asked for it’ is just another way that society has long
trivialized harms suffered . . . .”).
58. WESTIN, supra note 56, at 26. Part of the thread uniting privacy theorists’ traditional refusal to
protect candidate privacy is the voluntariness of the decision to run for office. By choosing to step
forward, one’s privacy interests are implicitly forfeited. This comports with the common privacy law
principle that once information is voluntarily revealed in public, that information is by definition no
longer private. In the Fourth Amendment context, this principle is known as the “third-party doctrine.”
See Neil Richards, The Third-Party Doctrine and the Future of the Cloud, 94 WASH. U. L. REV. 1441
(2017) (describing the third-party doctrine and challenges in applying it in a digital age). In United
States v. Jones, a Fourth Amendment case about long-term GPS tracking, Justice Sotomayor
challenged the concept that information voluntarily disclosed in public loses all claim to privacy: “it
may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy
in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties. . . . This approach is ill-suited to the digital age,
in which people reveal a great deal of information about themselves to third parties . . . .” 565 U.S.
400, 417 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring). Sotomayor cautioned against treating “secrecy as a
prerequisite for privacy.” Id. at 418.
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state and federal constitutional claims.59 In cases dating from the early
1900s to present, courts have exhibited the same reflexive denial of
protection for candidate privacy that privacy theorists forwarded, citing
the value of an informed citizenry, waiver via the voluntary choice to run
for office, and the status of information about candidates as paradigmatic
“matters of public concern.”60 Facing these formidable headwinds, the
discussion below provides a sampling of privacy claims that candidates
have attempted.
A first category of claims sound in tort.61 In contrast to defamation
claims to which truth is a defense, privacy torts remedy privacy and
dignity interests that are harmed when true information is revealed.62
Because torts are creatures of state law, claims and elements required to
prove them vary. What does not vary is state courts’ routine unwillingness
to hand candidates privacy tort victories.

59. Though nowhere explicitly recognized in the Constitution, the U.S. Supreme Court has
recognized a constitutional right of privacy located in the “penumbras” of amendments in the Bill of
Rights. See United States v. Griswold, 381 U.S. 479, 484–86 (1965). Candidates have asserted
constitutional claims of a right of privacy via the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments.
See, e.g., Medina v. City of Osawatomie, 992 F. Supp. 1269, 1270 (D. Kan. 1998) (First and Fourth
Amendments); Patrick v. City of Overland Park, Kan., 937 F. Supp. 1491 (D. Kan. 1996) (First
Amendment); Jones v. Palmer Media, Inc., 478 F. Supp. 1124, 1126 (E.D. Tex. 1979) (Fifth
Amendment); Chamberlin v. Missouri Elections Comm’n, 540 S.W.2d 876, 880 (Mo. 1976) (Fifth
Amendment); State v. Morgan, No. 2294, 1987 WL 11809 (Ohio Ct. App. May 28, 1987)
(Fifth Amendment).
60. See, e.g., Roberson v. Rochester Folding-Box Co., 65 N.Y.S. 1109, 1110 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1900)
(“The moment one voluntarily places himself before the public, either in accepting public office, or
in becoming a candidate for office, or as an artist or literary man, he surrenders his right to privacy,
and cannot complain of any fair or reasonable description or portraiture of himself.”); Marks v. Jaffa,
6 Misc. 290, 292 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1893) (“Private rights must be respected . . . [but w]hen they
transgress the law . . . or put themselves up as candidates for public favor, they warrant criticism, and
ought not to complain of it.”). In one of the foundational cases in which a court recognized the right
to privacy following the Warren and Brandeis article, Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E.
68 (Ga. 1905), the court, in dicta, left open the possibility that candidates for public office could retain
some privacy interests:
The most striking illustration of a waiver is where one either seeks or allows himself to be
presented as a candidate for public office. He thereby waives any right to restrain or impede the
public in any proper investigation into the conduct of his private life which may throw light upon
his qualifications for the office, or the advisability of imposing upon him the public trust which
the office carries. But even in this case the waiver does not extend into those matters and
transactions of private life which are wholly foreign, and can throw no light whatever upon the
question as to his competency for the office, or the propriety of bestowing it upon him. Id. at 72
(emphasis added).
61. See Prosser’s four privacy torts cited above, supra note 50.
62. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E cmt. B (AM. LAW INST. 1977) (“It is
not . . . necessary to the action for invasion of privacy that the plaintiff be defamed. It is enough that
he is given unreasonable and highly objectionable publicity that attributes to him characteristics,
conduct or beliefs that are false, and so is placed before the public in a false position. When this is the
case and the matter attributed to the plaintiff is not defamatory, the rule here stated affords a different
remedy, not available in an action for defamation.”).
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Some candidates tried generalized “invasion of privacy” tort claims.63
A frequently cited example is Kappellas v. Kofman.64 In Kappellas, the
Supreme Court of California dismissed an invasion of privacy claim
brought by a candidate for office on behalf of her children.65 The plaintiff,
Inez Kappellas, ran for a spot on the city council of Alameda, California.
Prior to her decision to join the race, Kappellas had spoken out against the
business interests of the publisher of two local newspapers. Once
Kappellas became a candidate, the publisher-defendant allegedly warned
her that if she did not withdraw from the race, he would print “all the ‘dirt’
he could find” about her personal life and family.66 Kappellas did not
withdraw, and the defendant followed through with his threats in a series
of editorials detailing Kappellas’s children’s delinquency. Kappellas
alleged, inter alia, invasion of her children’s privacy.67 In denying her
privacy claim, the California Supreme Court explained that
Because of their public responsibilities, . . . candidates for . . .
office have almost always been considered the paradigm case of
“public figures” who should be subjected to the most thorough
scrutiny. In choosing those who are to govern them, the public
must . . . be afforded the opportunity of learning about any facet
of a candidate’s life that may relate to his fitness for office.68
The Kappellas Court’s reference to public figures derives from New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan,69 decided five years prior, in which the U.S.
Supreme Court required—in service of protecting First Amendment
rights—that defamation plaintiffs to prove a heightened standard (that
defendants acted with actual malice) when the plaintiff is a public figure.70
In 1967, the Court extended its public figure/actual malice rule to privacy
torts.71 As a consequence, courts routinely apply the public figure doctrine
to candidate privacy tort claims to protect the First Amendment rights of

63. See, e.g., Krueger v. Austad, 545 N.W.2d 205 (S.D. 1996) (candidate brought invasion of
privacy claim for letter in newspaper alleging wife’s improper business practices); Matson v. Dvorak,
40 Cal.App.4th 539 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (candidate for public office brought libel and invasion of
privacy claims against contributor to political organization that accused candidate of having hundreds
of dollars in unpaid fines and citations); Santillo v. Reedel, 634 A.2d 264 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993)
(candidate for district justice brought action alleging invasion of privacy against police chief).
64. 459 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1969).
65. See id. at 914.
66. Id. at 916.
67. Id. at 914 (Kapellas filed suit on her own behalf and on behalf of her minor children).
68. Id. at 922–23.
69. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
70. Id. at 283.
71. See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 390–91 (1967) (applying New York Times Co.’s public
figure doctrine to the false light tort).
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defendants. For example, in Vogel v. Felice,72 involving online statements
that allegedly placed a candidate in a false light, a California court of
appeals found that a lack of actual malice absolved the defendant of false
light liability.73
Aside from the public figure doctrine, privacy tort elements may
require courts to weigh whether the relevant information is a matter of
public concern.74 In the tort of public disclosure of private facts, for
example, even highly offensive disclosures are permitted if they are “of
legitimate concern to the public.”75 Already highly deferential to the
traditional media’s concept of what constitutes “news,”76 private matters
relating to candidates for public office are virtually always newsworthy.77
Thus, for example, in the 2011 New Hampshire Supreme Court case
Lovejoy v. Linehan,78 a candidate for county sheriff brought a public
disclosure of private facts claim against a deputy sheriff and a reporter for
disclosing his annulled assault conviction to the public.79 The court
72. 26 Cal. Rptr. 3d 350 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005).
73. Id. at 360. In Palmer v. Alvarado, 561 S.W.3d 367 (Ky. Ct. App. 2018), a candidate sued his
opponent alleging that ads aired during the campaign placed him in a false light. Palmer, 561 S.W.3d
at 373 (“While coming close to false light, this is still within the bounds of a legitimate political
purpose and does not rise to the level of actual malice.”). The Restatement’s version of the false light
tort does not contain a newsworthiness or matter of public concern defense. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 652E (AM. LAW INST. 1977) (stating that liability in a False Light claim arises “if (a) the
false light in which the other was placed would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b)
the actor had knowledge of or acted in reckless disregard as to the falsity of the publicized matter and
the false light in which the other would be placed”).
74. The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D defines the “[p]ublicity [g]iven to [p]rivate [l]ife”
tort as against “one who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life of another is subject to
liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the matter publicized is of a kind that (a) would be
highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) is not of legitimate concern to the public.”
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (AM. LAW INST. 1977) (emphasis added).
75. Id.
76. Shulman v. Grp. W. Prods., Inc. 955 P.2d 469, 485 (Cal. 1998) (“In general, it is not for a court
or jury to say how a particular story is best covered. The constitutional privilege to publish truthful
material ‘ceases to operate only when an editor abuses his broad discretion to publish matters that are
of legitimate public interest.’” (quoting Gilbert v. Med. Econ. Co., 665 F.2d 305, 308 (10th Cir.
1981))); see also Richards & Solove, supra note 50, at 1918 (“A number of courts are very deferential
to the media on newsworthiness, essentially concluding that if the media chooses to publish a story,
then this is the most viable evidence of its newsworthiness. . . . Such an approach virtually nullifies
the [public disclosure of private facts] tort in the media context.”). For a critique of the
newsworthiness problem in the computer age, see Erin C. Carroll, Making News: Balancing
Newsworthiness and Privacy in the Age of Algorithms, 106 GEO. L.J. 69 (2017) (“[E]ditors . . . no
longer dictate to the same degree what news we actually read. That determination is ever more in the
hands of computer engineers in Silicon Valley.”).
77. Numerous cases exhibit the broad nature of the newsworthiness test and courts’ deference to
editorial decisions of publishers. See Danielle K. Citron, Mainstreaming Privacy Torts, 98 CALIF. L.
REV. 1805, 1828–29 (2010) (noting that courts often defer to the media’s judgment of newsworthiness
and providing empirical support for that claim).
78. 20 A.3d 274 (2011).
79. Id. at 275.
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concluded that the “qualifications of a candidate for public office is an
area of legitimate concern to the public and, therefore, a candidate loses
his or her privacy right to this information.”80 As Lovejoy shows, the
legitimate public concern/newsworthiness test effectively precludes
candidate disclosure claims.81 Courts have thus been consistently
protective of speech in the political realm as against candidate privacy
tort claims.82
Aside from privacy tort claims, candidates have also asserted state and
federal constitutional privacy claims against Watergate-era state mandates
requiring them to file financial disclosures.83 In Klaus v. Minnesota State
Ethics Commission,84 a candidate argued that the disclosure statute was
an unconstitutional invasion of his right to privacy, the state lacked a
compelling interest for requiring the disclosure, the statute infringed on
his First Amendment rights, and that the statute violated the qualifications
clause of the Minnesota Constitution (which states that “[n]o religious test
or amount of property shall be required as a qualification for any office of
public trust in the state”).85 The Minnesota Supreme Court held that
80. Id. at 278 (citing Summe v. Kenton Cty. Clerk’s Office, 626 F. Supp. 2d 680, 692 n.8 (E.D.
Ky. 2009), aff’d in part, 604 F.3d 257 (6th Cir. 2010)); see also Matson v. Dvorak, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d
880 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that “whether a candidate for public office has refused or neglected
to pay fines against him is a legitimate issue of public concern.”); Fann v. City of Fairview, Tenn.,
905 S.W.2d 167, 172 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994) (holding “that the newspaper articles [disclosing
expunged criminal records] clearly concerned a ‘matter of public significance’ as the truthful
information concerned a candidate for public office”); Santillo v. Reedel, 634 A.2d 264, 266 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1993) (“[T]here is no question that the information [allegation of unwanted sexual advances
against a minor] was of legitimate concern to the public . . . . As candidate for district justice, he
sought a position that would enable him to judge the conduct of others and determine whether that
conduct was in conformity with the law.”).
81. As commentators increasingly recognize, and will be explored more fully below, privacy torts’
shortcomings fail to address modern realities. Might other torts address candidate privacy concerns?
For example, could a candidate faced with a highly offensive assault on their dignity seek redress for
an intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED)? RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (AM.
LAW INST. 1977). Given the U.S. Supreme Court’s reluctance to provide relief when the speech relates
to a matter of public concern, candidates are hard-pressed to prevail under this tort theory as well. See
Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 458 (2011) (holding that highly offensive picketing outside a service
member’s funeral related to a concerned public matter and therefore entitled to First Amendment
protection). Candidates asserting defamation and privacy tort claims often append IIED that generally
rises and falls with those other claims. See, e.g., Howell v. Am. Publ’g Co., 983 S.W.2d 79 (Tex.
App. 1998). But c.f. Miller v. Jones, 970 P.2d 571, 577 (Nev. 1998) (denying a candidate’s IIED claim
only because the candidate lacked sufficient evidence of emotional duress).
82. A good example is Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001). In Bartnicki, an anonymous
interloper recorded a cell phone conversation of two individuals involved in union negotiations in
violation of wiretap statutes. Id. at 518–19. The Court denied relief to the plaintiffs in large part
because the recorded discussion involved a matter of public concern: “a stranger’s illegal conduct
[wiretapping] does not suffice to remove the First Amendment shield from speech about a matter of
public concern.” Id. at 535.
83. See supra note 59.
84. Klaus v. Minnesota State Ethics Comm’n, 244 N.W.2d 672 (1976).
85. MINN. CONST. art. I, § 17; Klaus, 244 N.W.2d at 675.
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disclosure provisions requiring those seeking public office to make
available information regarding property interest holdings were
reasonable and proper, and that whatever invasion of privacy may result
does not deprive the candidate of a protected constitutional right.86
In response to a similar disclosure statute challenge, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court made the following observation about the nature of
privacy for candidates and public officials, focusing explicitly on the
voluntary nature of running for office:
While public officials, of course, do not waive their constitutional
rights, they are nevertheless set apart from other members of
society in terms of certain rights, as the law on libel makes clear.
One who willingly puts himself forward into the public arena, and
accepts publicly conferred benefits after election to public office,
is legitimately much more subject to reasonable scrutiny and
exposure than a purely private individual.87
For the Wisconsin Supreme Court, the remedy to candidate privacy
incursions is not to run.88
At the federal level weighing U.S. constitutional privacy claims, the
Fifth Circuit made a distinction between constitutionally protected
privacy interests in “intimate decisions” versus what it saw as a lesser
right to financial privacy.89 In the end, after careful review of the privacy
interests of candidates against financial disclosure,90 the court again cited
the voluntary decision to run for office as dispositive:
Plaintiffs in this case are not ordinary citizens, but . . . people who
have chosen to run for office. That does not strip them of all
86. Klaus, 244 N.W.2d at 676–77; see also Cty. of Nevada v. MacMillen, 522 P.2d 1345, 1350 n.7
(Cal. 1974) (“The public’s right to know of matters which might bring about a conflict of interest
between the public employment and the private financial interests of those holding public office is a
laudable and proper legislative concern and purpose.” (quoting Carmel-By-The-Sea v. Young, 466
P.2d 225, 226 (Cal. 1970))).
87. In re Kading, 235 N.W.2d 409, 417 (Wis. 1975). Candidates attempting to shield their family
members from mandatory disclosure requirements likewise found an unsympathetic ear. See, e.g.,
Hunter v. City of N.Y., 391 N.Y.S.2d 289, 299, 301 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976) (holding it not
unreasonable to require disclosure of a spouse’s financial records, citing the requirement’s connection
to the city’s permissible goal of fostering public confidence in the integrity of public service).
88. Or, as in the case of President Trump and his tax returns, attempt to refuse to disclose them.
See infra section III.C.
89. Plante v. Gonzalez, 575 F.2d 1119, 1123 (5th Cir. 1978) (“The right to privacy extends only to
intimate decisions, usually connected with the family; any right to financial privacy does not rise to
constitutional significance.”).
90. Overturning an earlier, pre-Watergate decision, City of Carmel-By-The-Sea v. Young, 466 P.2d
225, 231–32 (Cal. 1970) (concluding that “the protection of one’s personal financial affairs and those
of his (or her) spouse and children against compulsory public disclosure is an aspect of the zone of
privacy which is protected by the Fourth Amendment and which also falls within that penumbra of
constitutional rights into which the government may not intrude absent a showing of compelling need
and that the intrusion is not overly broad”).
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constitutional protection. It does put some limits on the privacy
they may reasonably expect. . . . .Financial privacy is a matter of
serious concern, deserving strong protection. The public interests
supporting public disclosure for these elected officials are even
stronger. We join the majority of courts considering the matter
and conclude that mandatory financial disclosure . . . is
constitutional.91
In addition to bringing claims challenging financial disclosure
requirements, candidates have also attempted to shield juvenile or
expunged criminal records. In one such case, Judge Posner displayed his
signature distaste for people shielding information about themselves. In
Willan v. Columbia County,92 local police searched the FBI’s National
Crime Information Center database and discovered that Thomas Willan,
a candidate in Lodi, Wisconsin’s 1999 mayoral race, had been convicted
as a minor under Georgia’s Youthful Offender Act.93 Police then disclosed
this information to the public.94 Willan brought suit, arguing that the
search of the database and disclosure of this juvenile felony conviction
violated his Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and
constituted an invasion of his privacy in tort.95 Judge Posner (who has
long voiced concerns about privacy enabling fraud) was unmoved:
“[s]erious constitutional issues . . . would arise if candidates for office
could use the concept of privacy to conceal their criminal records from
the electorate.”96 Other courts have reached similar conclusions on the
question of whether a candidate’s right to privacy extends to concealing
past criminal convictions.97
In the one case98 in which the U.S. Supreme Court appeared to protect
the privacy interests of candidates, the Court’s majority did so in a highly
“perverse[]” way (to use dissenting Chief Justice Rehnquist’s word).99 In
Chandler v. Miller,100 the Court examined the constitutionality of a
91. Plante, 575 F.2d at 1135–36 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
92. 280 F.3d 1160 (7th Cir. 2002).
93. Id. at 1161.
94. Id. at 1162.
95. Id.
96. Id. Courts routinely deny similar efforts by candidates to seek remedy for disclosure of past
felony convictions. See, e.g., Medina v. City of Osawatomie, 992 F. Supp. 1269, 1277 (D. Kan. 1998)
(“Political candidates in today’s society, for good or for ill, should expect information about their past
behavior to come to light, and Mr. Medina had to recognize the possibility that his status as an exfelon would become a campaign issue.”).
97. See Medina, 992 F. Supp. at 1279.
98. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305 (1997).
99. Id. at 325 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
100. 520 U.S. 305 (1997).
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Georgia law requiring that candidates for designated public offices submit
to drug testing.101 Libertarian nominees for impacted offices challenged
the statute’s constitutionality, asserting that the drug tests violated their
First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights.102 Proponents of the law
argued that the public had every right to information about candidates for
office.103 The Eleventh Circuit relied on the familiar rationale that
candidates for public office have purposely stepped into the limelight.104
It reasoned, “candidates for high office must expect the voters to demand
some disclosures about their physical, emotional, and mental fitness for
the position.”105
The U.S. Supreme Court saw things differently. It struck down
Georgia’s statute using a surprising rationale. The majority did not hold
that drug testing proved too invasive of candidates’ right to privacy,106 nor
did it attempt to draw a fine line between information about candidates
that the public has a right to learn versus information it had no right to
collect. Instead, the Court reasoned first that the state had failed to
establish a sufficient need for drug testing candidates,107 and second that
candidates for public office are sufficiently under the microscope such
that the public has less intrusive means of gathering information about
potential illicit drug use.108 The Court explained, “[c]andidates for public
office . . . are subject to relentless scrutiny—by their peers, the public, and
the press. Their day-to-day conduct attracts attention notably beyond the

101. Id. The statute required candidates to present a certificate from a state-approved drug testing
lab certifying “that the candidate [had] submitted to a urinalysis drug test within 30 days prior to
qualifying for nomination” and that the results of that drug test tested negative for “marijuana,
cocaine, opiates, amphetamines, and phencyclidines.” Id. at 309. The “designated state offices” were
“Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Secretary of State, Attorney General, State School Superintendent,
Commissioner of Insurance, Commissioner of Agriculture, Commissioner of Labor, Justices of the
Supreme Court, Judges of the Court of Appeals, judges of the superior courts, district attorneys,
members of the General Assembly, and members of the Public Service Commission.” Id. at 309–10
(internal quotation marks omitted). When the case came down, similar laws had been proposed
(though none had been enacted), in Louisiana, Maryland, and Washington State. See Richard Hill,
Chandler v. Miller: A New Standard for Evaluating State Statutes Requiring Disclosure of
Information from Political Candidates, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 453, 461 (1999).
102. See Chandler, 520 U.S. at 310.
103. Id. at 311–12.
104. Id. at 312.
105. Id. (quoting Chandler v. Miller, 73 F.3d 1543, 1547 (11th Cir. 1996)).
106. Id. at 318. The Court noted that the law’s requirements were minimally invasive. Id. (“The
State permits a candidate to provide the urine specimen in the office of his or her private physician;
and the results of the test are given first to the candidate, who controls further dissemination of
the report.”).
107. Id. at 319 (“Nothing in the record hints that the hazards respondents broadly describe are real
and not simply hypothetical for Georgia’s polity.”).
108. Id. at 320–21.
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norm in ordinary work environments.”109 If a candidate uses drugs, the
Court concluded, massive popular scrutiny of candidates for political
office is bound to unearth it.110 In his dissent, Justice Rehnquist wondered
how the majority could at once protect the privacy interests of candidates
while simultaneously acknowledging that candidates have none.111
As this brief survey of court reactions to candidate assertions of privacy
reveals, candidates have largely been out of luck. Courts have echoed
privacy theorists’ dismissal of candidates’ privacy interests.112 Under
virtually every legal theory attempted, candidates have voluntarily
ventured into the public glare; they cannot then protest when it shines too
brightly. As the next section describes, two shifts in the nature of political
campaigning in the United States prompt rethinking this
reflexive response.
II.

FOUNDATIONAL SHIFTS

Privacy theory and judicial precedent consistently deny candidates
legal protections of their privacy interests. Two extreme shifts challenge
this instinctive denial: a profoundly changed information architecture and
the changing nature of who runs for office.
A.

The New Campaign Environment

The 2016 election threw into relief a deeply changed information
landscape for political campaigns. For the vast majority of this country’s
109. Id. at 321.
110. Id.
111. Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (writing, “the Court perversely relies on the fact that a candidate
for office gives up so much privacy—’[c]andidates for public office . . . are subject to relentless
scrutiny–by their peers, the public, and the press’—as a reason for sustaining a Fourth Amendment
claim”) (citations omitted)).
112. This is not to say that laws never ride to the rescue for privacy incursions candidates
experience. For example, federal hacking laws have policed candidate privacy. In one instance,
prosecutors convicted David Kernell, a former student at the University of Tennessee, for hacking
into Sarah Palin’s personal email during her 2008 vice presidential bid. Kim Zetter, Sarah Palin Email
Hacker Sentenced to 1 Year in Custody, WIRED (Nov. 12, 2010, 11:43 AM),
https://www.wired.com/2010/11/palin-hacker-sentenced [perma.cc/BP7C-VNC7]. Kernell took
photos from Palin’s account, including pictures of her children, and screen shots of email messages
and posted them on 4Chan and Imageshack. Id. Prosecutors charged Kernell with a variety of federal
crimes including wire and computer fraud, identity theft, and obstruction of justice (for destroying
evidence). Id. Palin testified at trial that the hacking had caused her family emotional distress. Id.
Hacking of political campaign email and social media platforms remains a continuing threat. See
Lesley Clark & Tim Johnson, Have Politicians Learned from the 2016 Email Hacks?, MCLATCHY
DC (June 18, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/nation-world/national/nationalsecurity/article213212239.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2020) (quoting the advice from security experts
that “we have no privacy anymore, zero” so candidates should assume their personal emails will
be hacked).
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history, information about candidates came from three principal sources:
the candidates themselves, candidates’ opponents, and the traditional
media. While there is no question that opponents and even sometimes the
media have engaged in trickery and misinformation during political
campaigns throughout U.S. history,113 the channels of mass
communication in those contexts were relatively straightforward. The
public largely trusted the comparatively few media outlets that reported
on political candidates, providing candidates an opportunity to set the
record straight when needed.114
Those days are over. Quite a lot has been written about the evolving
media landscape since the rise of the internet.115 Such changes seem to
have accelerated as of late.116 Interesting new scholarship is surfacing
about the impact of these new realities on candidates and campaigns.
Stanford Law Professor Nathaniel Persily, writing in the wake of the 2016
election, summed it up well in the aptly-titled Can Democracy Survive
the Internet?:
[M]ost of the 2016 story revolves around the online explosion of
campaign-relevant communication from all corners of
cyberspace. Fake news, social-media bots (automated accounts
that can exist on all types of platforms), and propaganda from
inside and outside the United States—alongside revolutionary
uses of new media by the winning [presidential] campaign—
combined to upset established paradigms of how to run
for [office].117
Arguably, the “legacy” media’s traditional gatekeeping role was in
decline even before the rise of the internet.118 Likewise, the
113. For a vivid account of this history, see Charles S. Clark, Politicians and Privacy, CQ
RESEARCHER 6–8 (Apr. 17, 1992).
114. Richard L. Hasen, Cheap Speech and What it Has Done (to American Democracy), 16 FIRST
AMEND. L. REV. 200, 201 (2018) (“[T]he economics of cheap speech . . . have undermined mediating
and stabilizing institutions of American democracy including newspapers and political parties, with
negative social and political consequences.”).
115. See, e.g., Richards & Solove, supra note 50, at 1918–19 (“Warren and Brandeis worried about
an overly-sensational press. . . . Today, in comparison, the ‘media’ consists not only of the
mainstream press (as well as television and radio) but also of the hundreds of millions of people
around the world who can disseminate text, images, and video from their mobile phones and personal
computers. The privacy torts have not been able to deal with the traditional media, and this burgeoning
new media is raising the stakes and posing even greater challenges.”).
116. Hasen, supra note 114.
117. Nathaniel Persily, Can Democracy Survive the Internet, 28 J. DEMOCRACY 63 (2017).
118. See AXEL BRUNS, GATEWATCHING AND NEWS CURATION: JOURNALISM, SOCIAL MEDIA, AND
THE PUBLIC SPHERE 19 (Steven Jones ed., 2018) (describing other scholars’ accounts that citizen
journalism predated the internet); Mary-Rose Papandrea, The Missing Marketplace of Ideas Theory,
94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1725, 1726–27 (2019) (“Our current communications environment feels
like a marketplace, if not a very crowded and noisy street fair. We are blasted with information and
different voices fighting for our attention (and, in many cases, financial support). The internet has
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decentralization of campaign control over messaging to independent
advocacy groups plays a role here too.119 But there can be no escaping that
the internet and digital media forms have drastically altered the campaign
environment. As Persily describes it, “[a]ll the worry about shady
outsiders in the campaign-finance system running television ads seems
quaint when compared to networks of thousands of bots of uncertain
geographic origin creating automated messages designed to malign
candidates and misinform voters.”120
Professor Tim Wu describes how traditional First Amendment
protections are no match for the new media environment. In a piece called
Is the First Amendment Obsolete?, Wu writes:
[E]merging techniques of speech control depend on (1) a range of
new punishments, like unleashing “troll armies” to abuse the
press and other critics, and (2) “flooding” tactics (sometimes
called “reverse censorship”) that distort or drown out disfavored
speech through the creation and dissemination of fake news, the
payment of fake commentators, and the deployment of
propaganda robots.121
Professors Mary Ann Franks and Ari Waldman also argue that preinternet assumptions about the First Amendment no longer hold true.
Once, the marketplace of ideas led to the truth; in the past, harmful speech
was best addressed by more speech; historically, even modest regulation
of speech silenced minority or dissenting views.122 But, they write,
[w]hatever merit these claims may have had in the past, they
cannot be sustained in the digital age. Unbridled, unlimited free
speech rights, especially in an era of technologically mediated
lowered if not eliminated the barriers to entry so that everyone can have a voice, not just the most
powerful or the very rich. The traditional media no longer has such a dominant gatekeeping role in
determining what information makes its way into the public conversations.”).
119. “Super PACs” (independent expenditure-only groups) and “dark money” groups are
fundamentally changing the campaign landscape thanks to decades of contorted campaign finance
litigation. See “What is a PAC/What is a Super PAC?”, OPENSECRETS,
https://www.opensecrets.org/pacs/pacfaq.php [perma.cc/6775-4RF2]. For a quick review of decades
of campaign finance litigation, see Tom Goldstein, An Explainer on Campaign Finance Litigation,
SCOTUSBLOG (May 20, 2014, 12:05 PM) https://www.scotusblog.com/2014/05/why-campaignfinance-law-matters [perma.cc/W42V-JZ8M].
120. Persily, supra note 117, at 70.
121. Tim Wu, Is the First Amendment Obsolete?, KNIGHTS FIRST AMEND. INST.: EMERGING
THREATS SERIES (2017), https://knightcolumbia.org/content/tim-wu-first-amendment-obsolete
[https://perma.cc/7E9W-Y9BH] (“[T]he use of speech as a tool to suppress speech is, by its nature,
something very challenging for the First Amendment to deal with. In the face of such challenges, First
Amendment doctrine seems at best unprepared. It is a body of law that waits for a pamphleteer to be
arrested before it will recognize a problem.”).
122. Mary A. Franks & Ari Ezra Waldman, Sex, Lies, and Videotape: Deep Fakes and Free Speech
Delusions, 78 MD. L. REV. 892, 892 (2019).
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expression, have led to the disintegration of truth, the reign of
unanswerable speech, and the silencing and self-censorship of
women, queer people, persons of color, and other racial and
ethnic minorities.123
The impact of these realities on candidates is profound. In many
respects, candidates have not only lost the ability to control campaign
messaging but have suffered acute and distressing changes in how people
(and non-human actors) inflict harm on their campaigns and them
personally.124 And, unlike in the past, the harm is not localized to a
particular day’s newspaper that one would need microfiche to retrieve.
These harms linger indefinitely at our fingertips.125
For candidates, the proliferation of anonymous activity online is one
source of this destabilization. Anonymous tactics have been available to
harm-doers since the invention of the mask. But the scale and scope with
which digital technology enables tortious anonymous speech dramatically
alters the experience of candidates. Legislative and judicial actions have
stymied their ability to seek redress. In the early days of the internet,
Congress acted to protect platforms that hosted anonymous speech from
liability.126 Even aside from online immunity, the U.S. Supreme Court has
123. Id.; see also Douglas O. Linder, When Names Are Not News, They’re Negligence: Media
Liability for Personal Injuries Resulting from the Publication of Accurate Information, 52 UMKC L.
REV. 421, 424 (1984) (noting that “neither invasions of privacy nor injuries resulting from negligent
true statements are the sorts of harms that can be cured by ‘more speech’”); id. at 424 n.24 (“‘[T]he
extent to which the harm done by a statement is truly of the sort that “more speech” could not possibly
cure’ is a ‘helpful consideration’ in determining whether a statement is protected by the first
amendment . . . .” (quoting LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 651 (1978)));
Nabiha Syed, Real Talk About Fake News: Towards a Better Theory for Platform Governance, 127
YALE L.J.F. 337, 342 (2017) (“The internet—replete with scatological jokes and Prince cover songs—
involves much more than political deliberation. And so any theory of speech that focuses only on
political outcomes [i.e., that the marketplace of ideas cures false speech] will fail because it cannot
fully capture what actually happens on the internet.”).
124. Wu documents the impact of troll armies and reverse censorship on journalists. See Wu, supra
note 121 (describing horrific impact of troll armies and flooding techniques on dissenting journalists).
Left out of his discussion but certainly implicated is the impact of such devices on candidates and real
questions about whether such tactics will force otherwise qualified candidates out of the race.
125. VIKTOR MAYER-SCHÖENBERGER, DELETE: THE VIRTUE OF FORGETTING IN THE DIGITAL
AGE 52 (2009) (“Modern technology has fundamentally altered what information can be remembered,
how it is remembered, and at what cost. As economic constraints have disappeared, humans have
begun to massively increase the amount of information they commit to their digital memories.”).
Indeed, in a world where one’s youthful digressions are now memorialized in digital form, younger
generations may face difficulties at a scale not previously experienced. Maureen Dowd, Now Comes
the Naked Truth, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 2, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/02/opinion/sunday/
katie-hill-resigns-millennials-boomers.html [https://perma.cc/YB6N-EJM7] (quoting Representative
Matt Gaetz (R-FL), “a lot of young people who grew up with a smartphone in their hands took
pictures, sent them, share messages and materials that are now recoverable later in life”). This is
discussed in greater detail at infra section III.B.
126. Communications Decency Act § 230, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2012) (immunizing hosts of online
content from liability in tort).
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affirmed First Amendment protections for anonymous campaign
speech.127 The combined sanction of anonymous campaign speech and the
removal of legal avenues to address tortious anonymous speech creates a
toxic brew for candidates.128
Importantly, the nature of the media environment is not always relevant
to candidate privacy interests. The public should arguably have access to
certain kinds of information regardless of the information environment
that produced it. For example, we may all agree that the public has a right
to information about a candidate’s criminal history—even when
sophisticated data and search tools limit practical obscurity candidates
may once have enjoyed.129 Conversely, there may be information about
candidates to which we as a society think the public should not access,
irrespective of a changed media environment such as images of candidates
in their bedroom.130
Whether or not we can agree on where the lines should be—what types
of information about candidates the public should and should not have
access to—the scope and scale of privacy harms now inflicted on
candidates risk not only greater harm to candidates personally, but harm
to democracy itself in the form of driving strong candidates away from
running for office.131 This is not a new fear. The rise of negative
advertising, “attack journalism,” and the devolution in campaign civility
have for decades led many to worry that otherwise qualified candidates
would remain on the sidelines.132 But the changed circumstances
127. See, e.g., Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., 525 U.S. 182 (1999) (striking a
Colorado requirement that petition circulators wear badges identifying themselves); McIntyre v. Ohio
Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995) (striking an Ohio law prohibiting anonymous
pamphleteering). But c.f. Helen Norton, Setting the Tipping Point for Disclosing the Identity of
Anonymous Online Speakers: Lessons from Other Disclosure Contexts, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
565 (2014) (describing cases in which courts have required the unmasking of anonymous
online speakers).
128. And indeed, other kinds of would-be plaintiffs, see CITRON, supra note 28 at 121–41
(discussing shortcomings in current law’s ability to address cyber-harassment).
129. But see U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. 749, 780 (1989) (finding that a
criminal defendant has an interest in retaining practical obscurity).
130. See Citron & Franks, supra note 28 (describing statutes criminalizing revenge porn); infra
section III.B (discussing Katie Hill).
131. This form of silencing has been empirically documented outside the candidate context as
disproportionately affecting women and minorities. See Citron & Penney, supra note 29, at 2331
(noting survey results demonstrated that tougher enforcement of cyberharassment “had a clear
salutary impact on women’s online contributions, sharing, and engagement. Female participants in
the survey—the predominant targets or victims of cyberharassment—said that they were more likely
to engage online in response to the cyberharassment law”).
132. In his 1991 book, political scientist Larry Sabato documents America’s long history with dirt
in politics and the rise of the modern “frenzy.” Sabato, supra note 3 at 1 (“It has become a spectacle
without equal in modern American politics: the news media, print and broadcast, go after wounded
politicians like sharks in a feeding frenzy.”); see also GLENN W. RICHARDSON, JR., PULP POLITICS:
HOW POLITICAL ADVERTISING TELLS THE STORIES OF AMERICAN POLITICS (2003). Repeated themes
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described here are not just of scale and scope. Whole new forms of harm
are erupting. Deep fakes provide one example.
Deep fakes are video or audio clips created using cheap and accessible
software that allows users to manipulate videos of candidates to make it
appear that they are saying or doing something they have not in fact said
or done.133 This is not simply sophisticated “lip-synching” or crude
editing.134 Rather, it is the use of artificial intelligence and facial mapping
technologies to create “digitally real” video or audio depicting the target
saying or doing something they did not.135 As I have argued elsewhere,
deep fakes of candidates for public office constitute an assault on
candidate dignity and a loss of control over one’s persona that harken back
to some of the core harms that prompted the rise of privacy law in the first
place.136 In addition to dignity harms, deep fakes of candidates harm
democracy in the form of misleading voters, contributing to voter mistrust
and apathy, and reducing voter choice if good candidates refuse to run in
an environment in which candidate deep fakes run amok.
For decades, candidates have accepted that a consequence of running
for office is that lies about them will routinely circulate (with the slight
consolation that knowing and malicious defamation is actionable).137 But
by stepping into the limelight, must candidates resign themselves to others
faking their identities to make authentic-seeming video and audio of them
without recourse? Should the law rise to protect candidates’ dignity
interests against such falsifications of their identities?138 The deep fake
to change defamation laws to address this problem have surfaced. For a recent example, see Daniel J.
Kornstein,
Political
Defamation
and
Democracy, N.Y. L.J. (July
20,
2016), https://www.ecbalaw.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/DanielKornstein.pdf [https://perma.cc/KCR9-A3R9].
133. Deb Riechmann, I Never Said That! High-Tech Deception of “Deepfake” Videos,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (July 2, 2018), https://apnews.com/21fa207a1254401197fd1e0d7ecd14cb
[perma.cc/94B3-VLXW].
134. Deb Riechmann, Fears Grow Over Deceptive “Deepfake” Videos Made to Sway Elections,
TALKING POINTS MEMO (July 2, 2018, 10:10 AM), https://talkingpointsmemo.com/news/deepfakevideos-adversaries-political-campaigns-national-security [perma.cc/HAH2-U5Y4].
135. See Bobby Chesney & Danielle K. Citron, Deep Fakes: A Looming Challenge for Privacy,
Democracy, and National Security, 107 CALIF. L. Rev. 1753, 1758 (2019) (describing how deep fake
technology works); see also Natasha Lomas, Lyrebird is a Voice Mimic for the Fake News Era, TECH
CRUNCH (Apr. 25, 2017, 10:16 AM), https://techcrunch.com/2017/04/25/lyrebird-is-a-voice-mimicfor-the-fake-news-era/ [https://perma.cc/D6Q8-6AA8] (describing technology that enables realistic
faked audio speech using algorithms derived from samples from recordings of speakers).
136. See Rebecca Green, Counterfeit Campaign Speech, 70 HASTINGS L.J. 1445, 1445 (2019)
(arguing that a ban on counterfeit campaign speech should survive First Amendment scrutiny).
137. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
138. Carefully reviewing right to publicity cases since they arose in the early 1900s, Jennifer
Rothman concludes that public figures have routinely brought successful right to publicity claims
based on protecting dignitary interests in their identities. JENNIFER E. ROTHMAN, RIGHT OF
PUBLICITY: PRIVACY REIMAGINED FOR A PUBLIC WORLD 110 (2018) (“Often it is claimed that the
right of publicity addresses economic injuries while the right of privacy addresses dignitary and
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example provides a window into how changing technological realities
require a reevaluation of candidate privacy.139 To cling to reflexive
assumptions denying candidate privacy interests amidst dramatically
changed campaign information environments involves risks.140
We are currently experiencing a highly destabilized information
architecture. This shifting ground requires rethinking assumptions about
candidate privacy previously taken for granted.
B.

Who Runs

A second major shift in modern campaigning is who runs for office.
Throughout this country’s history, women and minorities have struggled
to achieve fair representation, starting of course with efforts to secure
voting rights. But even after women got the vote and even after minority
voters achieved legal protections sufficient to make their voices heard at
the ballot box, female and minority candidates have not gained significant
ground in elections. The United States stands at seventy-sixth place
among democracies internationally in the percentage of female
representatives in national legislatures—tying with Afghanistan and Cabo
Verde.141 In the 400-year history of Virginia’s General Assembly, the
oldest continuous legislative body in the United States, fewer than 100
women have been elected (compared to more than 9,000 men).142 The

emotional distress injuries. As I have revealed, such a division did not exist historically, . . . and
makes little sense since injuries from the same harm of misappropriation can be economic, dignitary,
and emotional.”).
139. See Wu, supra note 121 (arguing that the First Amendment is no match for current harms the
internet inflicts).
140. Patrick J. Dobel, Judging the Private Lives of Public Officials, 30 ADMIN. & SOC’Y 115, 118
(1998) (“Privacy carves out a realm for intimacy, reflection, grace, or prayer to restore persons and
anchor their moral lives. Strong private lives provide the moral resources for officials to make
judgments that move beyond public opinion but still hold them accountable.”); Ruth Gavison, Privacy
and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421, 455–66 (1980) (“Privacy is . . . essential to democratic
government because it fosters and encourages the moral autonomy of the citizen, a central requirement
of a democracy . . . [I]t can be argued that respect for privacy will help a society attract talented
individuals to public life. Persons interested in government service must consider the loss of virtually
all claims and expectations of privacy in calculating the costs of running for public office. Respect
for privacy might reduce those costs.”).
141. See Women in National Parliaments, INTER-PARLIAMENTARY UNION (Feb. 1, 2019),
http://archive.ipu.org/wmn-e/classif.htm [https://perma.cc/6S5Y-WSBP].
142. Editorial Board, Opinion, Women Finally Have a Chance to Make History in Virginia. They
Already Have.” WASH. POST (Nov. 20, 2019, 1:22 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/
women-finally-have-a-chance-to-make-history-in-virginia-they-already-have/2019/11/20/ef27cec60afd-11ea-bd9d-c628fd48b3a0_story.html [perma.cc/4GPG-EP88] (noting that of those one hundred,
forty-one were elected in the November 2019 General Assembly election).
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story is much the same for minority candidates.143 L. Douglas Wilder
became the first African American to be elected governor in 1989; only
ten African Americans have served in the U.S. Senate.144 Robert
Menendez (D-NJ) has served in the U.S. Senate since 2007, but is only
the sixth Latino ever to do so.145
What causes the underrepresentation of women and minorities
(including sexual minorities) in elected office? The reasons are complex,
relating to “generations of cultural identities and political stereotypes”146
and, of course, access to money and pull. But if racist and sexist mores
explained underrepresentation in earlier eras, research suggests that overt
discrimination no longer fully explains the dearth of women and minority
representatives.147 Scholars have identified an important determinant:
143. IRIS M. YOUNG, INCLUSION AND DEMOCRACY 141 (2000) (“Minority cultural groups and
those positioned in devalued racial positions usually also lack effective political voice.”).
144. To date, ten African Americans have served in the United States Senate: Hiram Revels of
Mississippi (1870); Blanche K. Bruce of Mississippi (1875); Edward Brooke of Massachusetts
(1967); Carol Moseley Braun of Illinois (1993); Barack Obama of Illinois (2005); Roland Burris of
Illinois (appointed to fill Obama vacancy in 2008); Tim Scott of South Carolina (appointed to fill a
vacancy in 2013, won special election in 2014 to complete the term and was elected to a full term in
2016); William “Mo” Cowan of Massachusetts (appointed in 2013); Cory Booker of New Jersey
(2013); and Kamala Harris of California (2017). See African American Senators, U.S. SENATE
https://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/history/h_multi_sections_and_teasers/Photo_Exhibit_African_
American_Senators.htm [https://perma.cc/F33U-DF7V].
145. See 7 Things to Know About Senator Robert Menendez (D-NJ), NBC NEWS: PRESS PASS (July
6, 2013, 2:44 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/meet-the-press/7-things-know-about-sen-robertmenendez-d-nj-v19323059 [https://perma.cc/EV8S-RZK9] (noting that Senator Menendez was then
“the third Hispanic currently serving in the Senate, and only the sixth Hispanic to ever serve in
the body”).
146. JENNIFER L. LAWLESS, BECOMING A CANDIDATE: POLITICAL AMBITION AND THE DECISION
TO RUN FOR OFFICE 52 (2012).
147. Id. at 53 (citing research on campaign fundraising receipts and vote totals of female and
minority candidates as evidence that discrimination does not explain underrepresentation in
contemporary campaigns). Some might point to the 2018 midterm elections as evidence that women
have no such reticence to run. As has been reported widely, female candidates ran in record numbers
in 2018. See, e.g., Heather Caygle, Record-Breaking Number of Women Run for Office, POLITICO
(Mar. 8, 2018, 5:04 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/03/08/women-rule-midterms-443267
[https://perma.cc/R3QA-HY8Q] (noting that “[in the 2018] election cycle, more women are signing
up to run for the highest elected offices than ever before—so far, at least 575 women have declared
their intention to run for the House, the Senate or governor”). Yet, studies of the 2018 midterms
demonstrate that although the country witnessed a surge in women’s political activism following the
election of Donald Trump in 2016, “[t]hat activism . . . was not accompanied by a broad scale surge
in women’s interest in running for office. In fact, the overall gender gap in political ambition today is
quite similar to the gap . . . uncovered throughout the last 20 years.” Jennifer L. Lawless & Richard
L. Fox, A Trump Effect? Women and the 2018 Midterm Elections, 16 F. 665, 665 (2018). One might
make a similar claim that the number of women who ran for the Democratic nomination in the 2020
presidential election was historic. However, women make up roughly 50% of the population; that six
out of the twenty-four candidates originally in the running are women is far short of parity. Elizabeth
Llorente, Historic number of women aim for Madam President; experts credit #MeToo, recruitment
efforts, FOX NEWS (Jan. 24, 2019), https://www.foxnews.com/politics/more-women-than-evereyeing-u-s-presidency-experts-cite-metoo-and-decades-of-grooming-female-candidates
[https://perma.cc/RSA9-FXBG] (“While the U.S. has reached a new milestone in terms of women
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discrepancies in candidate ambition—that is, who throws their hat in the
ring in the first place.148 Political scientist Jennifer Lawless suggests
numerous factors that prevent women and minorities from becoming
candidates in the first place. High on her list are concerns about the loss
of privacy.149 Explained one research subject, “I would love to serve. But
in order to do that, you need to run. And given the invasion of privacy you
have to endure, you practically have to be a sociopath and not care at all
about what anyone thinks or what they’ll find out.”150
Outside the electoral context, the disproportionate harassment of
women and minorities is well documented.151 The experiences of women
running for president and having a greater presence in Congress, the U.S. lags behind many other
nations in female political power.”).
148. Lawless, supra note 146, at 57 (“Discrimination and structural obstacles certainly contribute,
in varying degrees, to the gender and racial disparities in our political institutions over time. But the
power of these explanations, even combined, is limited; neither focuses on the eligible
candidates . . . or begins to tackle the fundamental question of whether women and racial minorities
are as politically ambitious as white men to emerge as candidates.”).
149. See Lawless, supra note 146, at 171–74. Other factors included, for example, fundraising
obstacles and negative campaigning. Id. at 166–72. Professor Patrick Dobel describes the impact of
gender norms historically on women running for public office: “[t]he collapse of public and private
[made] the excessive scrutiny of private lives especially perilous to women entering public
office. . . . Often their very entrance into the public domain defined them as public women, an old
term of insult as well as an imputation that they neglect their private obligations.” See Dobel, supra
note 140, at 128. In the case of minorities, political scientist Raphael Sonenshein documents the long
history of black candidates being discouraged from running for office. See Raphael J. Sonenshein,
Can Black Candidates Win Statewide Elections?, 105 POL. SCI. Q. 219 (1990). See generally Judson
L. Jeffries & Charles E. Jones, Blacks Who Run for Governor and the U.S. Senate: An Examination
of Their Candidacies, 57 NEGRO EDUC. REV. 243, 243 (2006) (“We submit that because Whites are
reluctant to vote for Blacks, especially Black high profile statewide candidates, Blacks will need to
serve an appropriate apprenticeship, garner strong party backing, and implement an effective
deracialized campaign strategy if they hope to offset White voter hostility.”).
150. Lawless, supra note 146, at 173. Commenters have voiced concerns about privacy-invasive
reporting preventing otherwise qualified candidates from running. See, e.g., Sean M. Scott, The
Hidden First Amendment Values of Privacy, 71 WASH. L. REV. 683, 713 (1996) (discussing the
potential chill of the First Amendment rights of those who would otherwise step forward in public
debate but for the cost of over-exposure); see also Anthony Lewis, Opinion, Abroad at Home; Sex
and Leadership, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 23, 1998), https://www.nytimes.com/1998/02/23/opinion/abroadat-home-sex-and-leadership.html [https://perma.cc/S67G-5AK6] (“The zeal to learn about bedroom
behavior has essentially ended the privacy of anyone who aspires to office. Is that a good way to
attract intelligent, sensitive Americans to public life?”). Scholars have also highlighted additional
harms of reporting on the personal lives of candidates. See, e.g., ANDREW B. HALL, WHO WANTS TO
RUN 66–67 (2019) (describing how moderate candidates choosing not to run because of excessive
media scrutiny drives polarization); SABATO, supra note 3 at 23 (citing “damage [to] the political
fabric of America by cheapening public discourse, trivializing the campaign agenda, breeding
cynicism and discouraging people from seeking public office”); DENNIS F. THOMPSON, RESTORING
RESPONSIBILITY: ETHICS IN GOVERNMENT, BUSINESS, AND HEALTH CARE 233 (2005) (noting that
coverage of candidates’ personal affairs detracts from public attention to issues that matter).
151. See CITRON, supra note 28 at 13–16 (describing how cyber harassment disproportionately
impacts women and minorities (including sexual minorities) and noting studies showing that nonwhite
females face cyber harassment more than any other group); Citron, supra note 29, at 1870 (describing
sexual privacy abuses and noting that “[m]ost often, women, nonwhites, sexual minorities, and minor
shoulder the abuse”). The Southern Poverty Law Center reports that 2018 witnessed a 50% increase
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and minorities online set this issue into particular relief.152 Much like
courts’ admonishing candidates who assert privacy interests that they can
simply choose not to run, victims of online harassment are regularly
advised to “toughen up or go offline.”153 Indeed, exposure to
disproportionate harassment causes women and minorities to opt out of
life online, to the detriment of opportunities they would otherwise
enjoy.154 Professor Danielle Citron explains,
[b]ecause online abuse disproportionately impacts women and
marginalized communities, so does the silencing that it produces.
As online abuse continues apace, women and marginalized
groups are forced offline. This endangers deliberative democracy,
which depends upon contributions from diverse voices and
perspectives—particularly groups historically excluded from the
‘marketplace of ideas.’155

in White Nationalist groups, see Maeve Duggan, 1 in 4 Black Americans Have Faced Online
Harassment Because of Their Race or Ethnicity, PEW RES. CTR. (July 25,
2017), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/07/25/1-in-4-black-americans-have-facedonline-harassment-because-of-their-race-or-ethnicity [https://perma.cc/E3EF-URBP]; Mark Potok,
The Year in Hate and Extremism, SOUTHERN POVERTY L. CTR., https://www.splcenter.org/fightinghate/intelligence-report/2017/year-hate-and-extremism [https://perma.cc/7ECV-HMJJ] (noting that
“[b]y far the most dramatic change was the enormous leap in anti-Muslim hate groups, from 34 in
2015 to 101 last year—a 197% increase”).
152. Working to Halt Online Abuse, an organization that tracks online harassment charted 4,043
cases of online abuse between 2006 and 2013. Of those, 70% of victims were women. Minorities
made up 16% of victims. See Working to Halt Online Abuse Comparison Statistics 2000–2013,
HALTABUSE.ORG, http://www.haltabuse.org/resources/stats/Cumulative2000-2013.pdf [https://perm
a.cc/PZ3L-WDYS]; see also Danielle K. Citron, Law’s Expressive Value in Combatting Cyber
Gender Harassment, 108 MICH. L. REV. 373, 374 (2009) (“The harassment of women online is a
pernicious and widespread problem. It can be severe, involving threats of sexual violence, doctored
photographs of women being suffocated, postings of women’s home addresses alongside the
suggestion that they should be raped, and technological attacks that shut down feminist blogs
and websites.”).
153. CITRON, supra note 28, at 19 (discussing the pattern of trivializing online harassment). Before
laws arose to address cyberharassment, Citron writes that “[t]he choice was theirs—that was the deal.”
See Danielle K. Citron, Addressing Cyber Harassment: An Overview of Hate Crimes in Cyberspace,
6 CASE WESTERN J.L. TECH. & INTERNET 1, 1 (2015).
154. See generally BAILEY POLAND, HATERS: HARASSMENT, ABUSE AND VIOLENCE ONLINE 89–
122 (2016) (describing the professional, psychological, and personal effects of gender-based online
harassment). Scholars are honing in on the flip-side of free speech—the idea that First Amendment
protections of hate speech serve to deny the free speech rights of its victims through a chilling effect.
See, e.g., Adrienne Lafrance, When Will the Internet be Safe for Women?, ATLANTIC (May 20, 2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/05/when-will-the-internet-be-safe-forwomen/483473/ [https://perma.cc/Q9W7-PKN7] (describing “swatting” attack on the home of
female politician).
155. Danielle K. Citron & Johnathon W. Penney, When Law Frees Us to Speak, 87 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2317, 2319–20 (2019).
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This silencing effect has obvious parallels to the decision not to seek
public office.156
Mounting evidence suggests that women and minority candidates do in
fact bear the brunt of harassment. Misogynist and racist attacks are as old
as democracy (and then some),157 but technology is being leveraged at a
scale never previously possible to intimidate and harass women and
minority candidates. The impact of physical and non-physical abuse in the
political realm has given rise to an international focus on violence against
women in politics.158 Notes political scientist Mona Lena Krook, “both
quantitative and qualitative data indicate that violence [including
psychological violence] against politically active women is prevalent and
has a devastating impact on democratic institutions and practices.”159 She
continues, “[w]omen who are younger or who belong to racial or ethnic
minorities seem to be particularly susceptible to attack.”160 Nonphysical
attacks on women in politics are often purposefully dignity-based, for
example circulating nude or doctored photos.161 Such attacks on candidate
156. Empirical evidence points to privacy concerns driving away minority voices. One study
concluded, for example, that LGBTQ individuals are three times more likely to cite privacy and
increased scrutiny as a reason against running for office than heterosexual individuals. See Angelia
Wagner, Avoiding The Spotlight: Public Scrutiny, Moral Regulation, and LGBTQ Candidate
Deterrence, 1 POL., GRPS. & IDENTITIES 1 (2019). Today, an online presence is a critical component
of running for office. Cynthia L. Bauerly, The Revolution Will Be Tweeted and Tmbl’d and Txtd: New
Technology and the Challenge for Campaign-Finance Regulation, 44 U. TOL. L. REV. 525, 526
(2013) (noting that “candidates’ online presence mirrors the range of activities that have previously
primarily occurred in person”).
157. DALE SPENDER, WOMEN OF IDEAS AND WHAT MEN HAVE DONE TO THEM (1982), cited in
Mona L. Krook & Juliana R. Sanin, The Cost of Doing Politics? Analyzing Violence and Harassment
against Female Candidates, PERSPS. ON POL. 3 (2019), https://www.cambridge.org/core/servic
es/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/997569433135FA170B
2789C88A48DD17/S1537592719001397a.pdf/cost_of_doing_politics_analyzing_violence_and_har
assment_against_female_politicians.pdf [https://perma.cc/CRN7-42ZH] (noting that “maligning a
woman’s character, often by reference to her sexuality, has been a recurring strategy historically to
discredit women’s ideas and inhibit their participation in traditionally male-dominated spaces”).
158. For example, in 2016 the National Democratic Institute campaign #notthecost focuses
attention on stopping violence against women in politics. See #NotTheCost: Stopping Violence
Against Women in Politics, NAT’L DEMOCRATIC INST., https://www.ndi.org/not-the-cost
[https://perma.cc/S7HA-U3GS]. In October 2018, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Violence
Against Women issued a report on violence against women in politics to the 73rd Session of the
United Nations General Assembly. See Statement by Dubravka Siminovic Special Rapporteur on
Violence Against Women, Its Causes and Consequences, UNITED NATIONS HUM. RTS. SPECIAL
PROC. (Oct. 5, 2018), https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Women/SR/SR_VAW_GA73_20
18.pdf [https://perma.cc/SEU5-AW3].
159. Mona L. Krook, Violence Against Women in Politics, 28 J. DEMOCRACY 74, 83 (2017); see
also Krook & Sanin, supra note 157, at 2 (describing how political violence “poses a challenge to
democracy when one side gets ‘its way through fear of injury and death’ rather than ‘through a process
in which individuals or groups recognize each other . . . as rational interlocutors”).
160. Krook, supra note 159, at 83.
161. As Krook and Sanin describe, “[s]exual objectification is one strategy of [political violence
through degrading images and sexist language]. . . . After the election of Croatian president Kolinda
Grabar Kitarovic in 2015, national news outlets published stills from an alleged sex tape of her; in

10 Green.docx (Do Not Delete)

2020]

4/28/20 6:43 PM

CANDIDATE PRIVACY

235

dignity impair democracy. As former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine
Albright wrote on the occasion of International Women’s Day in 2016,
“[w]hen a woman participates in politics, she should be putting her hopes
and dreams for the future on the line, not her dignity . . . .”162
There can be no doubt that troll armies, bots, and other disruptors of
online democracy regularly target non-minority male candidates with
brutal and unrelenting regularity. Yet evidence is mounting that women
and minorities who are otherwise eligible to run are disproportionately
targeted for reasons that have nothing to do with their qualifications for
office.163 When strong, qualified candidates turn away from seeking
public office, the marketplace of ideas shrinks and voter choice is reduced,
as is the strength of democracy.164
American law stands rigidly against providing an affirmative leg up to
any political candidate based on gender or minority status (unlike other
democracies which use proportional representation and/or gender quotas
to ensure minority and female representation).165 The American
democratic system operates from the premise of a level playing field.166
But the law (and courts) recognize voters’ interest in access to diverse
viewpoints.167 If the current campaign environment disproportionately
2016, photos supposedly of her wearing a bikini went viral.” Krook & Sanin, supra note 157, at 5.
Krook and Sanin also reference the tactic of employing “highly negative, gendered language to
characterize female politicians and their behaviors,” citing President Trump’s misogynistic
merchandizing featuring slogans like “Trump that Bitch!” in the 2016 election. Id. at 6.
162. Madeleine Albright, A Hidden Reality: Violence Against Women in Politics, CNN (Mar. 8,
2016), https://www.cnn.com/2016/03/07/opinions/madelaine-albright-protect-women-inpolitics/index.htm [https://perma.cc/4H2Y-P2NP].
163. See Mariana Spring & Lucy Webster, A Web of Abuse: How the Far Right Disproportionately
Targets Female Politicians, BBC NEWSNIGHT (July 15, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/blogstrending-48871400 [https://perma.cc/BKV4-FAYT] (describing the singling out of female candidates
and politicians with misogynistic threats).
164. The U.S. Supreme Court has generally not recognized the right of candidates to run for office.
See Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 142–43 (1974) (framing the protection as a means of
safeguarding the rights of voters to exercise the franchise).
165. Mona L. Krook, Reforming Representation: The Diffusion of Candidate Gender Quotas
Worldwide, 2 POL. & GENDER 303 (2006) (describing parliamentary gender quotas in democracies
throughout the world). See e.g., Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1020 (1994) (noting that
“minority voters are not immune from the obligation to pull, haul, and trade to find common political
ground, the virtue of which is not to be slighted in applying a statute meant to hasten the waning of
racism in American politics”).
166. Some exceptions exist. For example, Congress enacted the historic Voting Rights Act in 1964
to address systemic racism preventing minorities from exercising political choice. See Voting Rights
Act § 2, 52 U.S.C. § 10301 (Supp. III 2016) (protecting the ability in limited circumstances of
minority voting groups’ ability to elect the candidates of their choice).
167. See e.g., Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 32 (1968) (“Competition in ideas and governmental
policies is at the core of our electoral process and of the First Amendment freedoms. New parties
struggling for their place must have the time and opportunity to organize in order to meet reasonable
requirements for ballot position, just as the old parties have had in the past.”). While the struggle of
women and minority candidates to achieve office and minority party ballot access present distinct
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silences women and minority candidates, can the law be mobilized in
response? Certainly part of the solution involves invoking existing
harassment and other criminal statutes to protect candidates.168 But can
privacy law play a role?
When the internet first rose to prominence in American social and
political life, commenters and courts touted its potential for increased
democratic participation—a virtual town square.169 The Supreme Court’s
reverence for its potential seems to endure.170 But the 2016 election
sounded the alarm and raised awareness of the many ways in which the
internet inhibits and distorts public discourse.171 Privacy theorists have

challenges, both seek participation in the political realm. Democratic theorists have long argued that
diversity in representation improves democracy. See e.g., Jane Mansbridge, Should Blacks Represent
Blacks and Women Represent Women? A Contingent “Yes,” in WOMEN, GENDER, AND POLITICS: A
READER 201, 205, 208 (Mona L. Krook & Sarah Childs eds., 1999) (arguing that descriptive
representation “facilitates vertical communication between representatives and constituents,” allows
members in a “subordinate group” to “forge bonds of trust based specifically on the shared experience
of subordination,” and increases the “empirical . . . legitimacy of the polity”); Sveinung Arnesen &
Yvette Peters, The Legitimacy of Representation: How Descriptive, Formal, and Responsiveness
Representation Affect the Acceptability of Political Decisions, 51 COMP. POL. STUD. 868, 892 (2017)
(finding in a Norwegian survey that descriptive representation “increases the willingness to accept
public decisions.”); id. at 889 (“When decision-making bodies are descriptively representative, they
serve as a ‘legitimacy cushion,’ mitigating the negative effects of unfavorable outcomes.”); Claudine
Gay, Spirals of Trust? The Effect of Descriptive Representation on the Relationship Between Citizens
and Their Government, 46 AM. J. POL. SCI. 717, 731 (2002) (finding that “constituents are more
inclined to contact legislators who share their racial group membership.”). Cf. Guy-Uriel E. Charles
& Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Race and Representation Revisited: The New Racial Gerrymandering Cases
and Section 2 of the VRA, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1559, 1562 (2018) (“Faced with the stark
cartographical evidence of the State’s attempt to effectuate descriptive representation under the
ostensible guise of the [Voting Rights Act], the Court recoiled.”).
168. Supra note 28; see also Erin Coyle & Eric Robinson, Chilling Journalism: Can
Newsgathering Be Harassment or Stalking?, 22 COMM. L. & POL’Y 65, 98 (2017) (describing
criminal stalking and harassment claims against reporter for aggressive questioning of candidates).
169. Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997) (“[A]ny person with a phone
line can become a town crier with a voice that resonates farther than it could from any soapbox.”);
Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1609, 1648 (1999)
(“Cyberspace has the potential to emerge as an essential focal point for communal activities and
political participation.”); Kathleen M. Sullivan, First Amendment Intermediaries in the Age of
Cyberspace, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1653, 1669 (1998) (describing the internet as “First Amendment
manna from heaven”).
170. See e.g., Packingham v. North Carolina, 582 U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735 (2017) (“While
in the past there may have been difficulty in identifying the most important places (in a spatial sense)
for the exchange of views, today the answer is clear. It is cyberspace—the ‘vast democratic forums
of the Internet’ . . . .”). The Court continued, “[w]hile we now may be coming to the realization that
the Cyber Age is a revolution of historic proportions, we cannot appreciate yet its full dimensions and
vast potential to alter how we think, express ourselves, and define who we want to be. The forces and
directions of the Internet are so new, so protean, and so far reaching that courts must be conscious
that what they say today might be obsolete tomorrow.” Id. at 1736.
171. Danielle K. Citron & Neil M. Richards, Four Principles for Digital Expression (You Won’t
Believe #3!), 95 WASH. U. L. REV. 1353, 1385 (2018) (“Even when the First Amendment is properly
translated to the digital context, we need to make sure that its values are advanced against private
power in digital environments. . . . If we are committed to ensuring that our expressive traditions
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long recognized the potentially distortive impact of the internet,
suggesting that its democratic promise would not be realized if privacy is
inadequately protected.172
Is it time to reevaluate the exclusion of candidates from the privacy
protections given these dramatically changed circumstances? What might such
a reexamination look like? The following section takes up these questions.
III. RETHINKING CANDIDATE PRIVACY
What would a more nuanced approach to protecting candidate privacy
look like? To answer this question this section first examines vetting
practices for other positions of public trust—lawyers and judges—
drawing out privacy-protective aspects of those processes that shed light
onto how to think about candidate privacy. Next, it applies those
principles to a sampling of hypothetical cases in which the privacy
interests of candidates arise, demonstrating that courts can protect
candidate privacy without disserving either voters or the democratic
process. Finally, this section ends with a discussion of instances in which
denying candidate privacy may remain appropriate.
A.

Vetting Practices: Basic Principles

Candidates for public office are not the only aspirants to positions of
public trust who face privacy intrusions in the course of their ascent.
While the process of electing candidates to public office is unique in many
respects, parallels to other vetting practices are instructive. This section
examines core principles that inform vetting of applicants for admission

survive the translation to the digital age, nurturing the capacity of free speech in privately-controlled
online environments will be essential.”).
172. Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52 STAN.
L. REV. 1373, 1386–87 (2000) (arguing that strong data privacy protection regimes promote important
democratic values, including the “protection of individual dignity, promotion of personal autonomy,
and development of the capacity for meaningful participation in the social and political life of the
community”); Schwartz, supra note 169 at 1651 (“In the absence of strong rules for information
privacy, Americans will hesitate to engage in Cyberspace activities—including those that are most
likely to promote democratic rule.”). Most commentary focuses on digital technology’s impact on the
common man. Very few privacy scholars have worried about candidate privacy, except in fleeting
reference. See e.g., Jeffrey Abramson, Full Court Press: Drawing in Media Defenses for Libel and
Privacy Cases, 96 OR. L. REV. 19, 52 (2018) (touching on privacy incursions candidates suffer given
the current media environment). This could in part be because they share the reflexive exemption of
candidates from the privacy canon that persist. See e.g., Daniel J. Solove, The Virtues of Knowing
Less: Justifying Privacy Protections Against Disclosure, 53 DUKE L.J. 967, 1010 (2003) (critiquing
the public figure doctrine and its impact on democratic discourse in the Information Age, Solove
echoes the exemptions of candidates: “A candidate’s socioeconomic background can shed light on
that candidate’s beliefs, values, and biases. Information about politicians’ health can be relevant to
how vigorously they can carry out their duties and whether they can live out a term in office”).
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to state bar associations. Like a vet examining a horse before a race,173
those who vet would-be lawyers typically examine all aspects of
aspirants’ history and circumstances to determine whether they are
qualified for this position of public trust, whether any aspect of their lives
might expose them to bribery or conflict of interest, and whether they
possess the characteristics worthy of the legal profession (honesty, good
judgment, and so forth).
In some respects, comparing elections to vetting procedures for lawyers
suffers from an apples-to-oranges problem. Elections are unwieldy, public
processes in which voters have the ultimate say. Lawyers are vetted via
far more controlled and scripted methods—often behind a veil of
confidentiality.174 The voting public is messy and disparate—
incomparable to careful and deliberate state boards of bar overseers. Still,
they share important goals. Both are concerned with establishing whether
a person is qualified and desirable for a public position of trust; the vetting
process acts as a deterrent to those undeserving; the process (ideally)
weeds out people who might abuse their position; and both help reveal
information to decision makers about a person’s qualifications.175
Noting these distinctions and similarities between elections and the
processes of vetting lawyers, the discussion below highlights three
features of attorney vetting. First, lawyer vetting practices focus on
gathering information relevant to qualifications and fitness for the
position sought. Second, lawyer vetting takes affirmative measures to
protect the dignity and safety of those being vetted, thereby ensuring
qualified candidates will pursue the role in sufficient number. And third,
the lawyer vetting process ties the degree of invasiveness of the process
to the degree of public responsibility. These principles are helpful, albeit
imperfect, overlays for framing a more nuanced view of candidate privacy
in the modern age.

173. See Vet, ONLINE ETYMOLOGY DICTIONARY, https://www.etymonline.com/search?q=vet
[https://perma.cc/U8LK-755N]; Vet, THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1933 ed.) (defining “vet”
as “to submit an animal to examination or treatment by a veterinary surgeon”). The Oxford University
Press defines ‘vetting’ as “[t]he process of investigating someone thoroughly, especially in order to
ensure that they are suitable for a job requiring secrecy, loyalty, or trustworthiness.” See Vetting,
LEXICO, https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/vetting [https://perma.cc/X7WV-N3JB].
174. Also, lawyers must pass a state bar exam in order to be admitted to the state bar; for better or
worse, politics requires no entrance exam.
175. Mitchell M. Simon, Limiting the Use of Expunged Offenses in Bar and Law School Admission
Processes: A Case for Not Creating Unnecessary Problems, 28 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB.
POL’Y 79, 83 (2014) (describing the attorney character and fitness vetting process).
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Is It Relevant?

A first feature of vetting processes for lawyers is that they seek
information relevant to the qualifications of the position sought. Each
state has its own formulation of the qualities lawyers should possess.176
Bar applicants have successfully refused to provide information on the
grounds that the information sought is not relevant to their qualifications
or fitness. In Cord v. Gibb,177 the Virginia Board of Bar Examiners
rejected a woman’s character and fitness application because she lived
with a man while unmarried. Writing in 1979, the court found that,
“[w]hile [Plaintiff’s] living arrangement may be unorthodox and
unacceptable to some segments of society, this conduct bears no rational
connection to her fitness to practice law.”178 In another example, an
applicant refused to answer questions related to her mental health history.
A court concluded that although the question asked on the character and
fitness questionnaire was indeed too broad as worded, mental health
information was relevant to the task of vetting lawyers and could be
explored.179 As these examples demonstrate, there is at least some check
on the scope of information the vetting entity can access. And, in these
instances, courts have undertaken a review of whether the information
sought is relevant to the qualifications required of the position.
Journalists tackling the problem of how much personal information
about candidates should be reported to the public have commonly
concluded that there should be some nexus between the information and
the candidate’s qualification for office.180 But scholars like Frederick
Schauer point out that virtually all information about candidates is
relevant to some voter.181 And if that is so, it becomes impossible to cabin
176. Each state develops rules governing character and fitness criteria, many relying on the
National Conference of Bar Examiners to conduct character and fitness investigation. Twenty-one
states and the District of Columbia use the National Conference of Bar Examiners to conduct character
and fitness investigations (Alabama, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Mississippi, Montana, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, Wyoming). See Character and Fitness
Investigations, NAT’L CONF. B. EXAMINERS, http://www.ncbex.org/character-and-fitness
[https://perma.cc/Z2M8-6GPN].
177. 254 S.E.2d 71 (Va. 1979).
178. Id. at 73.
179. Clark v. Va. Bd. of Bar Exam’rs, 880 F. Supp. 430, 436 (1995) (“The Court accepts that an
attorney’s uncontrolled and untreated mental or emotional illness may result in injury to clients and
the public. This conclusion is supported by the recent cases of acute mental disability among lawyers
which have resulted in license suspensions by the Virginia State Bar. . . . Thus, it is clear from the
facts before the Court that, at some stage in the application proceeding, some form of mental health
inquiry is appropriate.”).
180. Taylor, supra note 1.
181. Frederick Schauer, Public Figures, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 905, 908 (1984) (describing “the
special political need for virtually total [press] freedom to question the . . . qualifications of political
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what information voters are entitled to know. This quandary has led courts
to err on the side of disclosure. As argued here, information’s relevance
to a candidate’s qualifications for office should reemerge as at least one
factor in balancing a candidate’s right to privacy.
2.

Dignity and Safety of Candidates

A second feature is that state bar vetting procedures are designed to
ensure the dignity and safety of aspiring lawyers. To do so, the vetting
process features confidentiality protections.182 Attorney vetting processes
are invasive, requiring investigation into sensitive personal topics such as
financial, medical, and mental health history.183 But unlike elections for
office, candidates for the bar enjoy explicit confidentiality protections that
keep significant portions of the process from public view.184 When it
comes to elevating lawyers to federal judgeships, these protections
become even more stark. While parts of federal judicial nominations are
public, portions of investigation records remain confidential. The Senate
Judiciary Committee’s questionnaire for judicial nominees contains

officials”); see also Ralph G. Elliot, The Private Lives of Public Servants: What is the Public Entitled
to Know?, 27 CONN. L. REV. 821, 826–27 (1995).
182.
See e.g., Rule 402: Confidentiality, PA. BOARD L. EXAMINERS (2018), https://www.pabarexa
m.org/bar_admission_rules/402.htm [https://perma.cc/2Y5E-N76U] (noting how Rule 402 governs
the confidentiality of bar application materials and provides for only limited exceptions: “[e]xcept as
otherwise prescribed in these rules, the actions and records of the Board are confidential and shall not
be disclosed or open to inspection by the public”).
183. See NAT’L CONFERENCE OF BAR EXAM’RS, COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO BAR ADMISSIONS
REQUIREMENT 2019, at viii, http://www.ncbex.org/assets/BarAdmissionGuide/NCBE-CompGuide2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/J2NM-2AWG] (listing investigations for neglect of financial
responsibility, evidence of mental or emotional instability, and evidence of drug or alcohol
dependency under “Relevant Conduct”).
184. See e.g., VA. CODE § 54.1-108 (2020) (providing exemptions from the Virginia Freedom of
Information Act for named boards, including the Virginia Board of Bar Examiners (Title 54.1);
exemptions apply to the bar exam itself as well as any other applications for licensing in the profession
which encompasses character and fitness materials); id. § 54.1–3925.2 (providing the Board of Bar
Examiners access to criminal history records from any state or federal law enforcement agency, but
providing that such information “shall not be released to any other person or agency except in
furtherance of the investigation of the applicant or with the authorization of the applicant or upon
court order”); id. § 54.1–3925.3(C) (“Information furnished to and testimony given before the Board
or the character and fitness committee in the course of an investigation or hearing shall be privileged,
and any person furnishing information or giving testimony shall be immune from civil liability
therefor, unless it is shown that such person was motivated by actual malice.”). But see Konigsberg
v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36, 52 (1961) (holding that state bar applicant’s refusal to answer
questions related to Communist Party membership did not unconstitutionally impinged upon rights
of free speech and association protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, stating, “we regard the State’s
interest in having lawyers who are devoted to the law in its broadest sense, including not only its
substantive provisions, but also its procedures for orderly change, as clearly sufficient to outweigh
the minimal effect upon free association occasioned by compulsory disclosure in the circumstances
here presented”).
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public and confidential portions. The confidential portion includes
questions such as home address and phone number to protect nominees’
safety.185 The confidential portion also contains questions on sensitive
matters such as bankruptcy and tax information, health history, and past
investigations and complaints, presumably to protect the dignity interests
of nominees while still making this information available to the
Committee.186 In the case of federal judicial nominations, confidentiality
rules protect to the greatest extent possible the safety and dignity interests
of those being vetted.187
Confidentiality protections in vetting processes serve an important
goal: ensuring that qualified candidates will step up. Becoming a lawyer
or a judge requires diligence, self-sacrifice, and a degree of self-exposure.
The vetting process itself serves as a winnowing, ideally weeding out unfit
or unqualified candidates who know they would not make the cut. Yet
185. See S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, QUESTIONNAIRE FOR JUDICIAL NOMINEES,
https://www.casey.senate.gov/download/questionnaire-judicial-nominees [https://perma.cc/VA2EQE56]. In the Kagan, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh nominations, the Senate agreed to keep certain
documents “committee confidential.” See Press Release, U.S. S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Old
Process, New Nominee: Committee Confidentiality and Supreme Court Nominations (Sept. 4, 2018)
[hereinafter Press Release, Old Process, New Nominee], https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/press/rep
/releases/committee-confidentiality-and-supreme-court-nominations [https://perma.cc/4GMD-9JJF].
Keeping judicial nominees’ home addresses and phone numbers is a measure intended to protect their
safety. This practice is consistent with the federal judiciary norm of keeping home addresses and
phone numbers of judges from public view. Protecting judge’s home address in state courts has long
been a concern states have legislated in the face of violence against judges at their homes at the hands
of litigants. See Gavel to Gavel, NAT’L CTR. ST. CTS. (Jan. 7, 2011), https://www.ncsc.org/~/media/
Microsites/Files/Gavel%20to%20Gavel/archived%20pdfs/G%20to%20G%2052.ashx [https://perma.cc/N3TP-949R] (describing violence against judges and state efforts to protect
release of their home addresses, in part by passing laws prohibiting publication).
186. S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, supra note 185.
187. Not all nominees emerge with their dignity intact. In the context of federal judgeships, recent
cases abound in which successful (and unsuccessful) candidates emerge from the process with
diminished dignity. See e.g., Jack Crowe, Kavanaugh: My Family’s Reputation Has Been
‘Permanently Destroyed,’ NAT’L REV. (Sept. 27, 2018, 3:39 PM), https://www.nationalreview
.com/news/brett-kavanaugh-my-familys-reputation-has-been-permanently-destroyed/
[https://perma.cc/2BPU-LAF3] (“The consequences will extend long past my nomination. The
consequences will be with us for decades. This grotesque and coordinated assassination will dissuade
competent and good people of all political persuasions from serving our country.”); Derek Hawkins,
Trump
Judicial
Nominee
Fumbles
Basic
Questions
About
the
Law,
WASH. POST (Dec. 15, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morningmix/wp/2017/12/15/trump-judicial-nominee-fumbles-basic-questions-about-thelaw/?utm_term=.275a011a219a [https://perma.cc/EC37-UC9B] (describing Matthew Spencer
Petersen’s failed judicial nomination). That said, judicial nominees are subject to privacy invasion.
See Josh Lederman, The Intrusive Investigation Behind Supreme Court Nominations, PBS NEWS
HOUR (Feb. 16, 2016), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/the-intrusive-investigation-behindsupreme-court-nominations [https://perma.cc/R8X2-ABKG] (stating that Robert Kelner, partner at
Covington & Burling LLP who advises judicial appointees on Senate confirmation, explained, “I
always tell clients that they should think long and hard about whether they want to go through the
process at all . . . You give up any semblance of privacy. Your name may be floated, but then it might
become publicly known that the White House backed away because of something embarrassing.”).
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those designing vetting procedures understand that the process cannot be
too invasive; otherwise qualified candidates will refuse to subject
themselves. Admission to the bar is a difficult process, yet judging by the
high numbers of applicants seeking to fill these roles, the degree of
invasiveness has been calibrated reasonably.188 If aspects of bar admission
were perceived as overly invasive or dignity-demolishing, state bars
would (and do) make changes to ensure enough qualified candidates
sought these positions.189
In bar admissions, the admission decision is delegated to a state
institution; in elections, the delegee is the voting public. As a result, there
is no obvious mechanism for preserving candidate dignity. In the past,
many relied on the institutional press for this gatekeeping role. It no longer
functions as one. As a more nuanced application of privacy law might
recalibrate protections for candidates to accommodate countervailing
democratic principles—like ensuring strong and qualified candidates
remain interested in running.190
3.

Degree of Responsibility

A final characteristic of lawyer vetting is a connection between the
degree of privacy invasion of the vetting process and the importance of
the position sought. Lawyers carry great public responsibility to
administer justice with integrity. The proper functioning of our justice
system is a pillar of a functioning democracy. Lawyers make decisions
that directly impact the livelihoods and safety of members of the public.
As such, vetting processes for admission to the bar require a privacy188. That said, in the case of attorneys, approximately 45,000 people sat for the bar in the United
States in 2018, down from almost 84,000 in 2013. See THE BAR EXAM’R, FIRST-TIME EXAM TAKERS
AND REPEATERS IN 2018 (2018), https://thebarexaminer.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/880119/FirstTime-Exam-Takers-and-Repeaters-in-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/8JWF-8Z3S]; The BAR EXAM’R,
2012 STATISTICS (2014), https://thebarexaminer.org/wp-content/uploads/PDFs/2013-StatisticsCorrected030917.pdf [https://perma.cc/C77E-H67Y]. Since, there have been no major changes to
privacy protections in the bar admissions process during that time, the sharp reduction likely has more
to do with the highly publicized law school student debt crisis that dramatically reduced law school
application rates. See The Editorial Board, Law School Debt Crisis, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 24, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/25/opinion/sunday/the-law-school-debt-crisis.html
[https://perma.cc/WG7H-ASS7].
189. As an example, the Virginia Board of Bar Overseers recently changed its Character and
Fitness process to exclude questions about mental health after law students voiced concern that
otherwise qualified candidates would not step forward. See Justin Mattingly, Virginia Panel Scraps
Mental Health Question After Law School Student Push, RICHMOND TIMES DISPATCH (Feb. 8, 2019),
https://www.richmond.com/news/local/virginia-panel-scraps-mental-health-question-after-lawschool-student/article_36ece9b3-078c-5e12-b748-762555b8f081.html [https://perma.cc/MBX6SC5P].
190. René Reyes, Do Even Presidents Have Private Lives?, 17 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 477, 481
(2008) (arguing that qualified candidates may refrain from stepping forward even with no skeletons
in their closets).
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invasive process (despite, as noted, confidentiality provisions that limit
exposure). When lawyers become judges—with even greater
responsibilities for preserving the public trust—vetting processes become
more invasive and rigorous.191 Generally speaking, those designing
vetting processes for various public roles understand that the more
authority and responsibility a position of public trust entails, the more
privacy-invasive the vetting process must be.192
This “sliding scale” approach has seldom played out in electoral
vetting. When analyzing candidate privacy claims, the degree of
responsibility of the office only rarely plays a role.193 More commonly,
courts have reflexively denied candidate privacy interests without regard
to the office for which the candidate was running.194 A good example is
State v. Morgan, 195 an opinion from 1987 at the Court of Appeals in
Ohio.196 In that case, an unsuccessful candidate for Clark County
Commissioner refused to complete a financial disclosure citing, inter alia,
constitutional privacy protections.197 The court denied Morgan’s
assertions, holding that,
Morgan had available to him the simple and not very onerous
option of not running for office. Candidates for elective office
cannot reasonably expect the same degree of privacy enjoyed by
191. Federal judgeship vetting procedures provide one example. See S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,
supra note 185. In the Kagan, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh nominations, the Senate agreed to keep certain
documents “committee confidential.” See Press Release, Old Process, New Nominee, supra note 185.
192. In the security sector, for example, generally the “greater access to classified information or
sensitive physical locations a position provides, the stricter (and costlier) the vetting process is likely
to be.” See GENEVA CENTRE FOR THE DEMOCRATIC CONTROL OF ARMED FORCES, DCAF
BACKGROUNDER, VETTING AND THE SECURITY SECTOR
4
(2006),
https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/26080/12_bg_security_vetting.pdf [https://perma.cc/CWT5-K895].
193. Jones v. Palmer Media, Inc., 478 F. Supp. 1124, 1129 (1979) (“Because the Plaintiff was a
candidate for [the U.S.] Congress, the public had a right to know every aspect of Plaintiff’s life.”).
194. See, e.g., Matson v. Dvorak, 40 Cal. App. 4th 539, 550 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (holding, with
respect to a candidate for city council, that “[i]n choosing those who are to govern them, the public
must, of course, be afforded the opportunity of learning about any facet of a candidate’s life that may
relate to his fitness for office”); McCall v. Oroville Mercury Co., 142 Cal. App. 3d 805, 807 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1983) (holding that, without weighing the nature of the office sought, a “candidate for public
office has usually been considered a ‘public figure’ who has waived much of his right to privacy.
Almost any truthful comment on his qualifications for office, no matter how serious an invasion of
privacy, will be privileged.”); Fann v. City of Fairview, 905 S.W.2d 167, 172 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994)
(involving candidate for city commissioner, holding that “newspaper articles [disclosing expunged
criminal records] clearly concerned ‘a matter of public significance’ as the truth information
concerned a candidate for public office”);; see also Beruan v. French, 56 Cal. App. 3d 825, 828 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1976) (holding that with respect to a candidate for secretary-treasurer of the International
Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers Union, “by volunteering his services for office, a
candidate waives much of his right to privacy, and almost any truthful comment on his qualifications
for office . . . will be privileged”).
195. No. 2294, 1987 WL 11809 (Ohio Ct. App. May 28, 1987).
196. 1987 WL 11809, at *4.
197. Id. at *1.
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non-candidates. The recent demise of Senator Gary Hart’s
presidential candidacy is an extreme example of the lowered
privacy expectations of candidates for public office.198
The court made no distinction between Morgan’s run for local office and
the privacy interests of a candidate for the U.S. presidency. In numerous
other cases, the reflexive denial of candidate privacy described throughout
this discussion has applied equally despite real differences in the level of
responsibility and impact of the office sought.199
Weighing the relevance of information to a position sought, the impact
on dignity and safety of potential candidates, and the degree of
responsibility the position holds are key considerations taken into account
when state bar associations vet lawyers. Might these factors have an
application when it comes to evaluating the privacy interests of candidates
for office?
B.

Applying a More Nuanced Take on Candidate Privacy

Although the comparison between elections and vetting processes in
other contexts are imperfect at best, core principles help distill factors that
might inform a new perspective on candidate privacy.200 A more nuanced
assessment of candidate privacy claims might require courts to do more
than immediately discount candidate privacy interests. Rather, courts
might balance factors such as: (1) information’s relevance to
qualifications for office; (2) the impact on the dignity interests of
candidates and undue deterrence of qualified candidates from seeking
office; and (3) the degree of public trust entailed in the office sought. Such
198. Id. at *11.
199. This approach has its limitations. Less “important” public offices may be weighty in terms of
impact on constituents. Yes, a small-town mayor may have less responsibility and power than the
president of the United States, but the power a local official exerts can be great in relative terms.
200. Scholars have identified versions of these same principles when theorizing press coverage of
candidate’s personal lives. See e.g., Louis W. Hodges, The Journalist and Privacy, 12 SOC. RESP.:
JOURNALISM L. MED. 5, 14 (1983) (suggesting that “private information, [should be published,] even
against their will, if their private activity might [have] significant[] [impact on] . . . their [official]
performance”); Dan Meagher, Freedom of Political Communication, Public Officials and the
Emerging Right to Personal Privacy in Australia, 28 ADELAIDE L. REV. 176, 188 (2008) (arguing
that private information about candidates should be made public only “when the private
facts . . . would compromise, undermine or contradict the integrity of [a candidate’s] stated policy
agenda or . . . capacity to properly discharge his or her public duties”); Stanley A. Renshon, Some
Observations on Character and Privacy Issues in Presidential Campaigns, 13 POL. PSYCHOL. 565,
581–83 (1992) (arguing that the press should report on the private lives of candidates only when
relevant to personal and interpersonal integrity, assessing a candidate’s judgment, and leadership
capacity and/or skills); Frederick Schauer, Can Public Figures Have Private Lives?, 293 SOC. PHIL.
& PUB. POL’Y 293, 308–09 (2000) (arguing that from a democratic theory perspective, “[i]f there is
such a right to vote, and if voting decisions are essentially individual decisions that embody an
important dimension of individual autonomy, then it seems wrong to contend that the information that
some voters require for making their voting decisions should be subject to majoritarian control”).
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an approach would by necessity be fact-specific and would require courts
to weigh these factors to different degrees in different cases. Yet this
framework might allow a more calibrated view of candidate privacy that
could accommodate evolving campaign environments. The discussion
below provides some examples of how such factors might weigh.
Pennsylvania resident Mel Marin decided to run for U.S. Congress in
2010.201 When Mr. Marin refused to include his home address in his
candidate filings, election officials declined to certify his candidacy citing
a 1937 law requiring candidates to provide their home addresses on filing
forms.202 Mr. Marin argued that disclosing his home address violated his
privacy rights. Specifically, he believed (without citing evidence) that
“divulging his home address [would] subject him to threats of violence
and potential physical assault or death, and that providing the information
will ‘chill’ his speech and his efforts to become a candidate for public
office because he [would] be afraid to speak out on issues of vital public
importance.”203 The court had little sympathy for Marin’s claim to
privacy, noting that
there is a compelling reason to require candidates for elected
office to provide their home address on their nomination forms as
every candidate must be qualified for the position he seeks. If
members of the general public are required to provide their home
address information in order to register to vote and such
information is generally available to the public for inspection in
the voter rolls, why should a candidate for public office believe
he is somehow above or exempt from disclosing such
information?204
Without evidence of threats against his safety, Mr. Marin’s claim was
rightly dismissed.
In an age of doxxing, a new and threatening phenomenon, one’s home
address can be weaponized.205 Suppose a candidate proffers evidence of
credible threats against their safety? Should a candidate’s safety interests
201. Marin v. Sec’y of Commw., 41 A.3d 913, 914 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2012).
202. Id.; 25 PENN. STAT. § 2870 (2019) (“Each candidate for any State, county, city, borough,
incorporated town, township, ward, school district, poor district, election district, party office, party
delegate or alternate, or for the office of United States Senator or Representative in Congress, shall
file with his nomination petition his affidavit stating—(a) his residence, with street and number, if
any, and his post-office address.”).
203. Marin, 41 A.3d at 914.
204. Id. at 916.
205. See Peace Chiu, Government Scrambles to Protect Election Candidates from Doxxing, SOUTH
CHINA MORNING POST (Oct. 12, 2019), https://www.scmp.com/news/hongkong/politics/article/3032648/government-scrambles-protect-election-candidates-doxxing
[https://perma.cc/LC2P-6YJ3] (describing push to scrap requirement that candidates provide their
home addresses when registering as candidates in order to protect their safety).
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ever trump a required disclosure? The Supreme Court has weighed in
multiple times on the question of whether individuals and organizations
have rights against disclosure based on the presence of threats and
harassment, answering that question in the affirmative when the facts
support doing so. In NAACP v. Alabama,206 the U.S. Supreme Court held
that the civil rights organization did not have to disclose its membership
lists, citing the right of association and also the privacy interests of
members.207 In Doe v. Reed,208 a case involving whether petition signers
could prevent Washington State from disclosing their names and
addresses, the Court declined to protect personal information of petition
signers, noting that petitioners had failed to prove that the release of their
names and addresses would result in significant threat, harassment, or
reprisals.209 In both cases, the Court weighed the privacy interests against
both the democratic values at stake and the safety interests involved.210
Those same protections might be applied in some instances when
candidates for office face toxic privacy incursions—particularly if failure
to do so undermines the competing democratic value of ensuring qualified
candidates are not deterred from seeking office.211
Looking at the other factors, a candidate’s home address may or may
not be relevant to a candidate’s qualifications for office. If a candidate
professed to be low-income but lived in a wealthy neighborhood,
disclosing a home address may indeed be relevant.212 Likewise, a court
could examine the degree of responsibility of the office to weigh whether

206. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
207. Id. at 462 (“Petitioner has made an uncontroverted showing that on past occasions revelation
of the identity of its rank-and-file members has exposed these members to economic reprisal, loss of
employment, threat of physical coercion, and other manifestations of public hostility.”).
208. 561 U.S. 186, 200 (2010).
209. Id. at 200.
210. In NAACP, the Court concluded that compelling the NAACP to disclose its membership list
to the state of Alabama abridges “the rights of its rank-and-file members to engage in lawful
association in support of their common beliefs.” 357 U.S. at 460. In Doe, the Court held that disclosing
petition signatures “promotes transparency and accountability in the electoral process.” Doe, 561 U.S.
at 186.
211. In the case of federal judgeships, keeping judicial nominees’ home addresses and phone
numbers is a measure intended to protect their safety. This practice is consistent with the federal
judiciary norm of keeping home addresses and phone numbers of sitting judges from public view.
Infra note 227 (describing confidentiality protections for judicial nominees). In state court systems,
protecting judge’s home address in state courts has long been a concern states have legislated in the
face of violence against judges at their homes at the hands of litigants. See NAT’L CTR ST. CTS., supra
note 185.
212. A home address could be important to confirm candidate residency requirements are met. That
said, verifying a candidate’s residence can be confirmed without revealing their home addresses to
the public if competing factors compel protecting candidate privacy.
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a candidate disclosing a home address is warranted.213 Just as a candidate
for a federal judgeship is not required to publicly release their home
address,214 perhaps fact-specific leeway should be provided to candidates
for office.
A 1984 judicial election provides a second example of how candidate
privacy claims might be reconsidered. Judicial candidate and then-sitting
Judge David Aisenson filed suit against a local television network for
filming him in the driveway of his home and then airing a segment on
television depicting him unflatteringly.215 Judge Aisenson alleged, among
other claims, the tort of intrusion upon seclusion.216 The court viewed
Aisenson’s intrusion claim unsympathetically, citing waiver.217 The court
predictably reasoned that “relevant to whether an intrusion is ‘highly
offensive to a reasonable person’ is the extent to which the person whose
privacy is at issue voluntarily entered into the public sphere.”218 The court
further reasoned that “[w]hen the legitimate public interest in the
published information is substantial, a much greater intrusion into an
individual’s private life will be sanctioned, especially if the individual
willingly entered into the public sphere.”219
Imagine the candidate for office in this case had been Kiah Morris, the
embattled Vermont legislator subject to threats and racist attacks. Imagine
further that the person filming in her driveway was not a local television
news crew but instead one of the perpetrators of the harassment against
her armed with a cell phone camera. Should the same reflexive denial of
an intrusion upon seclusion claim (or a public disclosure of private facts
claim) stand?220 The “newsworthiness” or “matter of public concern” tests
have historically immunized defendants from such claims.221 But do the
shifts described above warrant rethinking this immunization?

213. That said, voters are more likely to have first-hand knowledge of candidates’ address in local
races in smaller localities. Likewise, as we see from, for example, the federal judicial vetting process,
home addresses of federal judges are understandable of high privacy value.
214. Supra note 191.
215. Aisenson v. Am. Broad. Co., 220 Cal. App. 3d 146, 152 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
216. Id. at 153. The plaintiff argued that the television crew filmed him as he walked from his home
to his car in a manner which, “[made] it appear as if [he] were a criminal or the subject of some
ongoing criminal investigation.” Id.
217. Id. at 146; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (AM. LAW INST. 1977) (stating
that the elements of an intrusion upon seclusion claim are: (1) intentional intrusion by the defendant,
physical or otherwise; (2) upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns;
(3) that is highly offensive to a reasonable person).
218. Aisenson, 220 Cal. App. 3d at 162.
219. Id. (citing Kapellas v. Kofman, 1 Cal.3d 20, 36–37 (1969)).
220. Supra note 80 (citing cases in which tort remedies were unavailable to candidates because of
the “legitimate public concern bar).
221. Supra section I.C.
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Weighing the factors suggested here, information gleaned from filming
the candidate in her driveway, depending on the specific facts, may or
may not be salient. If this hypothetical defendant’s action does not
meaningfully inform the public about the candidate’s qualifications for
office,222 this should factor into a court’s decisionmaking. In addition,
Kiah Morris’s safety was most certainly at issue and it is exactly this type
of harassment that pressured her, an otherwise qualified candidate, out of
a reelection bid altogether. Finally, one might also conclude that the
assault on her dignity and the inability of the law to adequately redress it
does a disservice to the prestigious office she held, her supporters, and the
democratic process.
In a further example, imagine that a deep fake video circulated,
depicting a candidate engaged in controversial sexual activity that has
been fabricated and that the candidate had not in fact engaged in. Suppose
further that the deep fake was so realistic that neither the naked eye nor
computer forensics could detect that it was fake.223 If such a video were
circulated widely during an election, should that candidate have legal
recourse? For many practical reasons, they may not. Assuming the maker
of the deep fake hides behind a veil of online anonymity, it would be
difficult for the candidate to bring suit directly. And, section 230 of the
Communications Decency Act would prevent recovery in tort against
websites hosting the content.224 But assuming these practical barriers fell
away, could a privacy claim stand? How would it be framed?
A candidate could attempt a right of publicity claim, arguing that their
name and likeness had been used without their consent.225 Yet, right of
publicity/appropriation claims (creatures of state law) typically require
commercial gain not present in the campaign context.226 And because tort
and constitutional privacy claims can so easily be defeated when the
subject is “newsworthy,” candidates are out of luck.227
222. Again, a fact-specific inquiry.
223. Drew Harwell, Top AI Researchers Race to Detect ‘Deepfake’ Videos: ‘We are Outgunned’,
WASH. POST (June 12, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/06/12/top-airesearchers-race-detect-deepfake-videos-we-are-outgunned/?utm_term=.0e9283e0e588
[https://perma.cc/Q6PU-W9FE].
224. 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(2) (2012) (providing immunity for internet content providers).
225. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
226. See Hill v. Pub. Advocate of the United States, 35 F. Supp. 3d 1347 (D. Colo. 2014) (denying
same-sex married couple appropriation actions against political advocacy organizations for use of
their wedding photos in political ads); Raymen v. United Senior Ass’n, Inc., 409 F. Supp. 2d 15
(D.D.C. 2006) (same); see also, Jesse Lempel, Combatting Deep Fakes Through the Right of
Publicity, LAWFARE (Mar. 30, 2018), https://www.lawfareblog.com/combatting-deep-fakes-throughright-publicity [https://perma.cc/S7K8-SBY3].
227. Another option might be defamation and/or false light, though as a candidate for public office
the First Amendment bar is set extraordinarily high. See Bobby Chesney & Danielle Citron, Deep
Fakes: A Looming Challenge for Privacy, Democracy, and National Security, 107 CALIF. L. REV.
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Still, compelling reasons merit enabling candidates to overcome First
Amendment bars to recovery in tort for deep fakes aimed at confusing
voters and distorting the electoral process.228 The specter of harm deep
fakes inflict on candidates and the democratic process suggests precisely
the rethinking of reflexive denial of redress for candidates advocated for
here. The factors suggested here weigh in favor of remedy: redressing
deep fakes works in service of informing voters; the dignity interests of
candidates in not having faked videos of them circulate is strong—the
specter of rampant and unchecked deep fakes of candidates will almost
certainly dissuade candidates from entering the race229; and, finally, the
higher the office sought, arguably the greater public harm deep fakes can
inflict.
As a final example, what about the circulation of non-consensual
intimate imagery of candidates? Though not a candidate at the time, the
experience of former U.S. Congresswoman Katie Hill is instructive. Katie
Hill took office as one of 117 women elected to office in 2018, and one
of the few openly LGBTQ women to win a seat in Congress.230 As one
commenter described, “Hill offered a radically different idea of what
American government could look like—and a radically different voice
than many of those that had come before her.”231 Hill resigned shortly
after several conservative news outlets circulated intimate images of Hill
and her estranged husband’s consensual joint affair with a
campaign staffer.232
1753, 1791 (2019) (discussing possible tort remedies including defamation and right to publicity for
the use of a person’s face in deep fakes); see also N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 272–73
(1964) (requiring that public figure plaintiffs in defamation suits prove actual malice). Note that two
justices’ concurrence made the distinction between press critiques of official conduct of public
officials (as in Sullivan) and press critique public officials’ private conduct. Id. at 301–02 (Douglas
& Goldberg, JJ., concurring) (“This is not to say that the Constitution protects defamatory statements
directed against the private conduct of a public official. . . . Purely private defendant has little to do
with the political ends of a self-governing society. The imposition of liability for private defamation
does not abridge the freedom of public speech or any other freedom protected by the First
Amendment.”). Id. at 301–02. The majority expressly reserved this question. Id. at 283 n.23.
228. Green, supra note 136.
229. See Simon Parkin, Politicians Fear This Like Fire: The Rise of the Deep Fake and the Threat
to Democracy, GUARDIAN (June 22, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/nginteractive/2019/jun/22/the-rise-of-the-deepfake-and-the-threat-todemocracy [https://perma.cc/KAR2-XB85] (discussing the damage deep fakes of political figures
could do to democracy).
230. Lux Alptraum, Katie Hill Resigned Because of Revenge Porn. This Smear’s Success puts
Many Women at Risk, NBC NEWS (Nov. 1, 2019), https://www.nbcnews.com/think/opinion/katiehill-resigned-because-revenge-porn-smear-s-success-puts-ncna1075126 [https://perma.cc/P7JEG58T].
231. Id.
232. Michael Calderone, After Katie Hill, Media Grapples with Possible Onslaught of Nude
Photos, POLITICO (Oct. 31, 2019), https://www.politico.com/news/2019/10/31/katie-hill-nudepictures-media-063064 [https://perma.cc/48VU-4KDG].
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Laws prohibiting the nonconsensual publication of intimate imagery
are unlikely to protect candidates.233 Even if such statutes did not exempt
matters of public concern (which many do),234 a court may look at the
candidate’s public status and decide this avenue of redress is unavailable
due to First Amendment protections for such speech—candidates are
quintessential matters of public concern.235 But, as suggested here, a judge
should think hard about competing democratic and First Amendment
values at stake. Viewed through a privacy lens and using the factors
proposed here, what happens in a candidate’s bedroom is arguably
irrelevant to a candidate’s qualifications for office. In the case of Katie
Hill, the assessment is complicated by the presence of her staffer, calling
into question her judgment.236 Were that not at issue, the relevance to a
candidate’s qualifications for office would be reduced. Likewise,
publication of nude photos of a candidate for office certainly impairs that
candidate’s dignity and safety interests.237 Harm to Katie Hill’s dignity
and safety interests drove her from office and has been widely cited as

233. One of the arguments forwarded by those supporting revenge porn statutes is that they involve
purely private speech. See e.g., CITRON, supra note 28 at 210 (“Protecting against the nonconsensual
disclosure of private communications . . . would inhibit a negligible amount of expression that the
public legitimately cares about. . . . Revenge porn does not promote civic character or educate us
about cultural, religious, or political issues.”).
234. According to the Cyber Civil Rights Initiative, of the forty-six states (plus Washington D.C.
and Guam) that have passed laws prohibiting nonconsensual pornography, nine state codes do not
include public interest exceptions (Arkansas, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia,
Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin). See Revenge Porn Laws, CYBER C.R. INITIATIVE
(2019), https://www.cybercivilrights.org/revenge-porn-laws/ [https://perma.cc/WZ7K-NWJD].
235. This is certainly the position taken by First Amendment advocates. See e.g., Andrew
Koppelman, Revenge Pornography and First Amendment Exceptions, 65 EMORY L.J. 661, 662
(describing the First Amendment pushback).
236. Katie Hill herself questioned her judgment with respect to sexual involvement with a campaign
staffer. See Emily Cochrane, Katie Hill Will Resign from Congress Amid Ethics Investigation, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 27, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/27/us/katie-hill-resigns.html [https://perma.cc/PKF7SEAS] (quoting Hill, “I still allowed it to happen despite my better judgment”). The disclosure of intimate
photos of candidates for office may call into question candidate’s judgment in other contexts. For example,
the privacy protections argued for here are lessened in the case of Anthony Weiner’s sending intimate
photographs to young women in large part because it reflects poor (and ultimately criminally culpable)
judgment on his part. Matt Zapatosky, Anthony Weiner Sentenced to 21 Months in Federal Prison, WASH.
POST (Sept. 25, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/250nthony-weinersentenced-to-21-months-in-federal-prison/2017/09/25/ad4165f4-a1f4-11e7-ade176d061d56efa_story.html [https://perma.cc/XF6R-DH89] (describing Weiner’s sentence for transferring
obscene material to a minor).
237. Upon leaving office, in her farewell speech on the House floor, Hill acknowledged fear for
her safety: “I am leaving because of the thousands of vile, threatening e-mails, calls, and texts that
made me fear for my life and the lives of the people that I care about. Today is the first time I’ve left
my apartment since the photos taken without my consent were released, and I’m scared.” Masha
Gessen, The Terrorization of Katie Hill, NEW
YORKER (Nov.
5,
2019), https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/the-terrorization-of-katie-hill
[https://perma.cc/8Y73-K8HD].
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likely to dissuade young women from running for office in the future.238
And finally, depending on the circumstance, a judge might find relevant
the nature of the office in evaluating such claims.
As these examples demonstrate, it is possible to address the privacy
concerns of candidates without sacrificing—and, in some cases, serving—
democratic values that support transparency and openness. Given the
current campaign climate and the kinds of privacy incursions candidates
currently face, it is time to reevaluate the reflexive denial of candidate
privacy rights.
C.

Nuanced Candidate Privacy and the Informed Voter

Nothing in the discussion above argues that embarrassing or
discrediting information about candidates must necessarily be shielded
from public view.239 Candidates might prefer to shield quite a bit of
embarrassing information from the public, but reassessing candidate
privacy interests does not require protecting tender egos. The public right
of access to information should be the default; candidate privacy
protections should be hard won.
Take the increasingly relevant question of candidate tax privacy.
Donald Trump became the first presidential candidate in the modern era
to refuse to disclose his tax returns.240 Given the controversial nature of
his presidency and his pursuit of re-election, accessing Trump’s tax
returns has become the subject of litigation from sea to shining sea (even
reaching the shores of the U.S. Supreme Court).241 Litigants are seeking
access to Trump’s tax returns through a variety of levers ranging from
238. Lisa Lerer, The Revenge Porn Debate Reaches Washington, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 28,
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/28/us/politics/katie-hill-revengeporn.html?searchResultPosition=1 [https://perma.cc/4J4M-KW4V] (quoting
nonconsensual
pornography lawyer Carrie Goldberg, “I fear the chilling effect the attack on Katie Hill will have on
other ambitious daring women and members of the L.G.B.T.Q. community thinking about careers in
politics”).
239. Nor does it upset the longstanding protections that set a high bar for candidate redress of
defamatory critique. As has been expected throughout the modern era, those who run for office must
develop a thick skin; the First Amendment rightly protects political speech criticizing their actions
unless it is a knowing or recklessly false representation of fact.
240. Presidential Tax Returns, TAX ANALYSTS, https://www.taxnotes.com/presidential-tax-returns
[https://perma.cc/VN4F-5FWK]. Mitt Romney was reticent about doing so but ultimately relented.
See Lori Montgomery et al., Mitt Romney Releases His Tax Returns, WASH. POST (Jan. 24, 2012),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2012/01/23/gIQAj5bUMQ_story.html
[https://perma.cc/84ZP-5MEM]; see also, John Wihbey & Mike Beaudet, Transparency, Corruption,
and the Information Needs of Communities: The Case of Personal Financial Disclosure, SSRN (Dec.
5, 2016) https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract_id=2880890 [https://perma.cc/3Z5VSA4T] (surveying fifty state personal financial disclosure laws required for candidates and public
officials).
241. Trump v. Vance, No. 19-635, 2019 WL 6797730, at *1 (U.S. Dec. 13, 2019). The Supreme
Court is expected to rule in June 2020 on these cases.

10 Green.docx (Do Not Delete)

252

4/28/20 6:43 PM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 95:205

Congressional investigative authority242 to New York’s state grand jury
subpoena power243 to California ballot access law.244 The types of legal
242. The House Ways & Means Committee has requested Trump’s tax returns as part of its
investigatory authority under 26 U.S.C. § 6103(f)(1) (2012) of the tax code. See Letter from Chairman
Richard Neal to IRS Commissioner Charles Rettig, p.1 (Apr. 3, 2019) (invoking authority under
section 6103(f)). With respect to the House Ways & Means request, the argument against allowing
access, despite the clear mandate on the face of the statute itself, is that Congress must assert a
legitimate purpose consistent with the House Ways & Means Committee’s legislative and
constitutional responsibilities. George K. Yin, Preventing Congressional Violations of Taxpayer
Privacy, 69 TAX L. 103, 119 (2015) (arguing that section 6103(f)(1) is “best understood as permitting
a tax committee disclosure of return information only if it serves a legitimate purpose, a minimal
condition merely requiring the action to be consistent with the committee’s legislative and
Constitutional responsibilities”).
243. In the case of the New York litigation, the question arises as part of a grand jury investigation
surrounding Trump’s alleged payment of “hush money” to two women during his 2016 campaign. Adam
Liptak, Supreme Court to Rule on Release of Trump Financial Records, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 13, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/13/us/supreme-court-trump-financial-records.html
[https://perma.cc/2WMM-5PU2]. Trump’s attorneys sought to invalidate the subpoena, claiming the
President has sweeping immunity from state criminal process while in office. The Second Circuit
unanimously rejected that claim. Trump v. Vance, 941 F.3d 631, 640 (2d Cir. 2019) (“We have no occasion
to decide today the precise contours and limitations of presidential immunity from prosecution, and we
express no opinion on the applicability of any such immunity under circumstances not presented here.
Instead, after reviewing historical and legal precedent, we conclude only that presidential immunity does not
bar the enforcement of a state grand jury subpoena directing a third party to produce non-privileged material,
even when the subject matter under investigation pertains to the President.”).
244. Some states considered whether to require candidates to disclose their tax returns as a
condition of candidacy. California became the first state to enact such a law in July 2019. Presidential
Tax Returns, supra note 240. California Governor Gavin Newsom signed Senate Bill 27, the
Presidential Tax Transparency and Accountability Act, into law on July 30, 2019. On August 6, 2019,
President Trump and the Republican National Committee challenged the law in federal court. See
John Wagner, Trump, RNC File Legal Challenges to Calif. Law Seeking Release of the President’s
Tax Returns, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 6, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-rnc-filelegal-challenges-to-calif-law-seeking-release-of-trumps-tax-returns/2019/08/06/440f9e0c-b87211e9-bad6-609f75bfd97f_story.html [https://perma.cc/KDQ8-VNG6]. The California Supreme
Court struck the statute as violating the state constitution just over four months later. Patterson v.
Padilla, 451 P.3d 1171, 1173 (2019) (citing CAL. CONST. art. II, § 5(c), which states, “[t]he
Legislature shall provide for partisan elections for presidential candidates, and political party and
party central committees, including an open presidential primary whereby the candidates on the
ballot are those found by the Secretary of State to be recognized candidates throughout the nation or
throughout California for the office of President of the United States, and those whose names are
placed on the ballot by petition, but excluding any candidate who has withdrawn by filing an affidavit
of noncandidacy” (emphasis added)). The California case implicated federal constitutional issues such
as the Qualifications Clause (U.S. CONST. art I, § 2 cl. 3) well outside the current project. See
Nathaniel Persily, Candidates v. Parties: The Constitutional Constraints on Primary Ballot Access
Laws, 89 GEO. L.J. 2181 (2001) (describing constitutional challenges to ballot access laws); Derek T.
Muller, Weaponizing the Ballot, SOC. SCI. RES. NETWORK (Sept. 9, 2019) (unpublished),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3450649 [https://perma.cc/UYY8-JMMG]
(providing a careful analysis of the constitutionality of states adding financial disclosure ballot access
requirements including discussion of the Qualifications Clause). If state and federal constitutional
hurdles had not stood in the way, a court might have applied a so-called “Anderson-Burdick”
balancing analysis. See Danielle Lang, Candidate Disclosure and Ballot Access Bills: Novel
Questions on Voting and Disclosure, 65 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 46, 57–61 (2017). The AndersonBurdick test requires courts weigh the character and magnitude of the burden on rights protected by
the First and Fourteenth Amendments against the interests set forth by the state in imposing the
burden. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983). If that burden is adjudged to be high, a
court will require the state to assert a compelling justification for the requirement. Id. at 788. If a court
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theories being advanced to support and oppose access vary depending on
the actors and laws animating these quests. So far, defenses against access
do not directly invoke candidate privacy themes—many are more closely
associated with presidential immunity and separation of powers questions
since the target for disclosure is a sitting U.S. President.245 Still, their
essence boils down to a core question: should privacy interests overcome
voters’ interest in accessing candidate Trump’s tax filings?246
In addressing that distilled question for purposes of the project at hand,
the factors suggested here weigh in favor of disclosure. First, sacrificing
candidates’ financial privacy interests in this instance serves to
meaningfully inform the public about candidates’ fitness for office. As
Dean Erwin Chemerinsky explained in an op-ed during California’s
wrestle with these questions,
[a] candidate’s tax returns include information about what a
candidate owns, which can let voters know of possible conflicts
of interest and whether there are entanglements with foreign
businesses and foreign governments. They reveal whether a
candidate owes money and to whom. Tax returns let voters know
how much a candidate has paid in taxes and what kind of tax
loopholes and shelters he or she has employed. The returns also
can be used to verify a candidate’s claim about wealth and
income.247

finds the burden on voters to be relatively low, the state’s forwarded interest need only be reasonably
justified. Id.
245. See e.g., Vance, 2019 WL 6797730, at *1 (hinging the question of access on the degree of
presidential immunity); Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP, 940 F.3d 710, 723 (D.C. Cir. 2019), cert.
granted, No. 19-715, 2019 WL 6797734 (U.S. Dec. 13, 2019) (noting that the Committee has issued
its subpoena to [an] . . . accounting firm with whom President Trump has voluntarily shared records
from his time as a private citizen, as a candidate, and as President).
246. For example, in litigation concerning the statute authorizing the House Ways & Means
Committee to access Trump’s tax returns, his lawyers argue that the Committee must assert a
“legitimate purpose.” Complaint at 1, Trump v. Comm. on Ways and Means, U.S. H.R., No. 1:19-cv02173, 2019 WL 3302724 (D.D.C. Jul. 23, 2019) [hereinafter Trump v. U.S. H.R. Complaint]
(arguing that the “Treasury Department denied the Committee’s request for the President’s federal
returns because it determined that the request had no legitimate legislative purpose”). In response, the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia evaluated the public interest in obtaining
Trump’s returns, finding that the public interest was sufficiently high to overcome Trump’s assertions
of immunity. Mazars, 940 F.3d at 730 (“Whether current financial disclosure laws are successfully
eliciting the right information from the sitting President, occupant of the highest elected office in the
land, is undoubtedly ‘a matter of concern to the United States.’”).
247. Erwin Chemerinsky, Requiring Candidate Tax Returns is Legal, L.A. TIMES (July 31, 2019),
https://enewspaper.latimes.com/infinity/article_share.aspx?guid=05e5b57e-283b-4b8b-bb5fb6f947024b21 [https://perma.cc/FV9P-ZPMU]. Then again, a candidate’s refusal to disclose tax
information may be all the public needs to know. The specter that a candidate is hiding something
itself provides the voting public with valuable information without harming the candidate’s privacy
interest via forced disclosure.
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Second, one could be concerned that disclosure of personal tax
information could harm the dignity or safety interests of President
Trump.248 Indeed this country has a history of politically-motivated tax
investigations aimed at dissenting individuals and groups that should
elevate such concerns.249 Tax disclosure requirements—whether they
come from courts or federal or state statutes—should consider dignity and
safety interests of candidates for office and mitigate these concerns where
possible. California’s (now-invalidated) statute addressed some of these
issues in its text by limiting the disclosure rule to candidates for U.S.
president and governor only250 and mandating certain sensitive
information like home addresses, Social Security Numbers, email
addresses, and medical information be redacted before public release.251
In the litigation involving the House Ways & Means Committee’s
investigative authority to access Trump’s returns, section 6103(f)(1) of
the Tax Code mitigates this concern by requiring review of the target tax
information in closed session.252 To the extent that financial disclosure
provisions are found to target the politically powerless or attempt to

248. See supra note 185. Even Judge Posner, as harsh a critic of privacy as they come, seemed open
to the possibility that “the revelation of intensely private financial or medical information that was
not a matter of public record or germane to [one’s] candidacy . . . might . . . [enable a candidate] to
appeal to a concept of ‘privacy’ . . . .” Willan v. Columbia Cnty., 280 F.3d 1160, 1163 (7th
Cir. 2002).
249. REPORT ON ADMIN. PROCEDURES OF THE INT’L REV. SERV. TO THE U.S. ADMIN. CONF., S.
DOC. 94-266, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS. 967 (1975) (detailing various politically-motivated congressional
requests for tax information into groups like the Black Panther Party, the Students for a Democratic
Society, the New Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam, and the Progressive Labor
Party). Trump’s lawyers have raised the argument that subpoenas for his tax returns are politically
motivated in the California, New York, and congressional litigation. See e.g., Trump v. U.S. H.R.
Complaint, supra note 246, at *2 (arguing in the complaint, “[a]s Secretary Mnuchin explained after
compiling a 42-page chronology of public statements from prominent Democrats: ‘The public record
demonstrates that the animating purpose of [the Committee’s request] was and remains exposure of a
political opponent’s private tax information’” (internal citations omitted)).
250. SB-27 Primary Elections: Ballot Access: Tax Returns, CAL. LEGIS. INFO. (2020),
https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billCompareClient.xhtml?bill_id=201920200SB27 [https://p
erma.cc/EKJ7-MTXL].
251. These provisions mirror impulses in related federal laws. For example, in the case of the famed
Nixon tapes, the federal statute at issue (the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act,
44 U.S.C. 2111 § (2012)) mandated minimizing invasions into Nixon’s privacy. See Nixon v. Adm’r
of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 464–65 (1977) (noting that “the Act’s screening process is designed to
minimize any privacy intrusions, a goal that is further reinforced by regulations which must take those
interests into account. The fact that apparently only a minute portion of the materials [relevant to
Nixon’s impeachment] implicates [his] privacy interests also negates any conclusion that the
screening process is an unreasonable solution to the problem of separating commingled
communications”).
252. 26 U.S.C. § 6103(f)(1) (2012) (“[A]any return or return information which can be associated
with, or otherwise identify, directly or indirectly, a particular taxpayer shall be furnished to such
committee only when sitting in closed executive session unless such taxpayer otherwise consents in
writing to such disclosure.”).
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intimidate dissenting voices, dignity and safety concerns must be
carefully considered.
As to the deterrence question, given that (until now) candidates for
president have routinely disclosed their taxes for the past forty years, little
evidence suggests that requiring tax disclosure dissuades qualified
candidates from running for high office.253 Since President Carter first
voluntarily disclosed his taxes, no candidate for president has mounted
significant resistance to the practice or complained that they would run
but for the disclosure—until President Trump.254 In fact, the norm of
disclosing one’s taxes as a candidate for president arguably properly
dissuades unqualified candidates from running (for example, those who
have violated tax laws).
And finally, given the immense power concentrated in the U.S.
presidency, the third factor suggested here—weighing the degree of
public trust the office sought when balancing candidate privacy against
the interests of informing voters—in this instance comes down heavily in
favor of access.
Candidate privacy raises hard questions to which the answer should
almost always be that voters have the right to know. Important values
weigh against finding liability for candidate privacy violations.255 Still, as
argued here, the reflexive response of “no privacy” should yield to a more
careful balancing for some candidates in some circumstances if we are to
ensure that strong candidates remain willing to step up.

253. In a footnote to its unanimous opinion, the Second Circuit in Trump v. Vance noted that release
of tax returns had not impaired previous presidents from executing their duties. Trump v. Vance, 941
F.3d 631, 641 (2d Cir. 2019), cert. granted, No. 19-635, 2019 WL 6797730 (U.S. Dec. 13, 2019)
(“We note that the past six presidents, dating back to President Carter, all voluntarily released their
tax returns to the public. While we do not place dispositive weight on this fact, it reinforces our
conclusion that the disclosure of personal financial information, standing alone, is unlikely to impair
the President in performing the duties of his office.”).
254. See Presidential Tax Returns, supra note 240. Mitt Romney was reticent about doing so but
ultimately relented. See Lori Montgomery et al., Mitt Romney Releases His Tax Returns, WASH. POST
(Jan. 24, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2012/01/23/gIQAj5bUMQ_story.
html [https://perma.cc/84ZP-5MEM]; John Wihbey & Mike Beaudet, Transparency, Corruption, and
the Information Needs of Communities: The Case of Personal Financial Disclosure (Ne. Pub. Law &
Theory
Faculty
Research
Papers
Series
No.
278,
2016),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract_id=2880890
[https://perma.cc/3Z5V-SA4T]
(surveying fifty state personal financial disclosure laws required for candidates and public officials).
See discussion in section II.C above and supra note 89.
255. See e.g., Levinson, supra note 7, at 265 (“Even if we believe there are cognizable
standards . . . [for protecting candidate privacy] and are absolutely confident that courts will always
be correct in . . . [applying standards to police it] one can still believe that the costs would still be too
high, for the fear of litigation might deter publication of even relevant materials.”).
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CONCLUSION
Justice Antonin Scalia was undoubtedly right: democracy takes
courage.256 Becoming a candidate for public office means stepping into
the limelight and subjecting even private aspects of one’s life to public
inspection. There can be no getting around it if the ideal of the informed
voter is to be realized. Yet the massive shifts in the modern campaign
environment, combined with the need to ensure that strong, qualified
candidates will throw their hat in the ring, requires a reevaluation of the
dignity interests of candidates and their ability to protect their (and their
families’) safety, their personas, and their privacy when circumstances
warrant. This may be accomplished in numerous ways in numerous
contexts by acknowledging candidate privacy as worthy of protecting, by
seeing violations of candidate privacy as a multifaceted harm not just to
candidates but also to the democratic process, and by engaging in a
balancing exercise when candidate privacy interests arise as opposed to a
reflexive denial.
This is a desirable path to pursue even acknowledging that it is a very
tough sell. We may be willing to curb First Amendment defenses when it
comes to protecting privacy interests of private individuals.257 We
reflexively revert to First Amendment sanctity when the privacy invasion
touches those most public of creatures: candidates. Still, an important and
countervailing democratic value receives too short a shrift in the modern
calculus: the silencing of would-be candidates who would run but for the
onslaught against their dignity the modern campaign environment
unleashes. This push-and-pull has been acknowledged in other contexts.
As Owen Fiss suggests, on occasion it is necessary to lower the voices of
those whose speech silences would-be participants in the
democratic process.258
256. Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 228 (2010) (“Requiring people to stand up in public for their
political acts fosters civic courage, without which democracy is doomed.”).
257. As a wild example, professional wrestler Terry Bollea, better known as Hulk Hogan, won a
$140 million jury verdict by claiming that, despite his public exploits, his non-public self suffered
privacy harm upon the nonconsensual publication of a video of him having sex. See Len
Niehoff, Bankrupt Marketplace: First Amendment Theory and the 2016 Presidential Election, 32
COMM. LAW. 1, 4 (2017) (describing how, at trial, Terry Bollea successfully made a distinction
between the actions of his alter ego, Hulk Hogan, and himself as a private individual who he believed
retained an “intact right of privacy regardless of what his Hogan character had said and done”). For
more traditional acknowledgment that the state may constitutionally protect the privacy interests of
private individuals, see The Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 541 (1989) (“We do not hold that truthful
publication is automatically constitutionally protected, or that there is no zone of personal privacy
within which the State may protect the individual from intrusion by the press . . . .”). RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (AM. LAW INST. 1977), supra note 74 (supporting the idea that law
should protect private matters of people who are not “of legitimate concern to the public”).
258. Owen M. Fiss, Why the State?, 100 HARV. L. REV. 781, 786 (1987) (arguing that when speech
silences others, “state regulation of speech is consistent with, and may even be required by, the
[F]irst [A]mendment”).
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Revisiting age-old candidate privacy assumptions will not fix the raft
of challenges facing the current campaigning climate; inspecting other
remedies—legal and otherwise—to address problems in modern
campaigning is important work. But rethinking knee-jerk refusals to
protect candidate privacy can and should play a role in advancing the
interests of candidates, voters, and our evolving democracy.

